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

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THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
ON LAND, 1904—1905
UP TO
THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

BY

J. H. ANDERSON, F.R.HIST.SOC.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW; LATE LECTURER AT KING'S COLL., LONDON; SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE IN INDIAN CIVIL AND HOME CIVIL (CLASS I.) EXAMINATIONS; LECTURER ON MILITARY HISTORY AND STRATEGY AT 5, LEXHAM GARDENS, W., AND LATELY AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

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PREFACE

THIS account of the early period of the land operations of this great struggle is based upon the following authorities: Chasseur; articles in *The National Review*, September, 1904; Colonel Bardonnaut's "Du Ya-lou à Liao-yang"; Hamley's "Operations of War"; Sedgwick's book; the German Official Account (G.O.A.); the Russian Accounts of V. Cheremisov and I. Shevtsov; the British Official Account (B.O.A) —by far the best account; Ian Hamilton's well-known work; *The Times'* "War in the Far East"; General de Négrier's "Lessons of the War"; Cowen's book; British Officers' Reports; Colonel Bujac's account of the war; Major Bird's strategy of this war; and the Naval and Military Official History of the War.

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The account of the Port Arthur operations is intentionally slight; as few places as possible are mentioned, and the spelling of them is mainly

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that adopted by the British Official Account; Roman figures are employed to denote Russian troops, and Arabic figures to denote Japanese troops.

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LIST OF DATES

1904.	Feb.	6.	Diplomatic relations broken off; Japanese embark at Sasebo.
	Feb.	8.	Togo at Port Arthur.
	Feb.	10.	War declared; Russia mobilises.
	Feb.	21.	A detachment of 12th Division at Pingyang.
	Feb.	23.	Treaty with Korea.
	Mar.	20.	1st Army from Pingyang on Anju.
	Mar.	27.	Kuropatkin at Liao-yang; rest of 1st Army landed at Chinampo.
	Mar.	28.	Skirmish at Tiessu.
	April	1.	1st Army from Anju on Wiju.
	April	13.	Death of Admiral Makarov.
	April	20.	1st Army at Wiju.
	April 25 to May 31.		Raid of Madritov.

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1904. April 25 to 26. 2nd Division takes Kintei Island; Guards take Kyuri Island.

April 28. Kuroki's orders for battle.

April 29. Six bridges laid by Kuroki.

April 30. 12th Division crosses at Sui-kuchin.

May 1. 2nd and Guard Divisions cross.

Battle of the Ya-lu—

6 a.m. Guns open.

7 a.m. Japanese three Divisions move towards the Ai Ho.

8 a.m. Japanese attack.

9.15 a.m. Kashtalinski retires into second position.

9.15 a.m. to 1 p.m. Japanese halt.

12 noon. Russian right centre retires.

1 p.m. Action at Ha-ma-tang.

2 p.m. Japanese converge on Ha-ma-tang.

May 2. Zasulich at Feng-huang-cheng.

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1904. May 4. Zasulich behind the Eastern Fen-shui-ling Pass.

May 6 to June 23. 1st Army at Feng-huang-cheng.

May 13. 2nd Army lands S.W. of Pi-tzu-wo.

May 15. Togo loses two battleships.

May 15 to 23. 5th Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade land S.W. of Pi-tzu-wo.

May 16. Port Arthur isolated.

May 17. Keller supersedes Zasulich.

May 19 to June 9. 10th Division lands at Ta-ku-shan.

May 24. Oku's orders for battle.

May 26. Battle of Nan Shan—

5.20 a.m. Chin-chou carried; guns open.

8.30 a.m. 1st Division attacks.

3.30 p.m. Japanese assault.

6.45 p.m. Russian left turned.

May 26 to June 26. Simple investment of Port Arthur.

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1904. May 30. Oku occupies Dalny; Cavalry combat at Te-li-ssu.

June 8. Battle of Hsiu-yen.

June 13. Oku moves N.

June 14 to 15. Battle of Te-li-ssu.

June 15. 7 a.m. Gerngross counter-attacks.

11.30 a.m. Stakelberg orders retreat.

12 noon. Gerngross retires.

June 15 to 19. Oku at Te-li-ssu; arrival of 6th Division.

June 20. Stakelberg at Kai-ping; Oku moves N. on Hsiung-yao.

June 23. Russian naval sortie.

June 24. Kuroki leaves Feng-huang-cheng.

June 26 to 27. Fen-shui-ling Pass.

June 26 to July 26. Distant attack of Port Arthur.

June 30. Kuroki occupies Mo-tien-ling Pass.

July 4. Keller's first reconnaissance.

July 6. Oku on Kai-ping.

July 9. Action at Kai-ping.

July 10 to 22. Oku at Kai-ping.

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1904. July 17. Keller's second reconnaissance, or battle of the Heaven-reaching Pass.

July 18. 12th Division at Chiao-tou.

July 19. Battle of Chiao-tou.

July 23. Oku moves N. on Ta-shin-chiao.

July 24. Nodzu moves N.W. on Hsi-mu-cheng.

Battle of Ta-shih-chiao—

5.30 a.m. Guns open.

7.30 a.m. 3rd and 5th Divisions advance.

3.30 p.m. They renew attack.

10 p.m. 5th Division advances.

July 25 to 29. Kuropatkin wastes four days.

July 25 to 31. Oku at Ta-shih-chiao; arrival of Oyama.

July 26 to Jan. 1, 1905. Proper siege of Port Arthur.

July 27. Zarubaiev at Hai-cheng.

July 30 to 31. Battle of Hsi-mu-cheng; 2nd and 4th Armies gain contact.

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1904. July 30. Wolf Hill captured.
July 31. Battles of Yang-tzu-ling and Yu-shu-ling.
Aug. 1. Oku moves N. to Hai-cheng.
Aug. 3. 2nd and 4th Armies at Hai-cheng.
Aug. 10. Russian naval sortie.
Aug. 14. Russian naval sortie.
Aug. 13 to 24. General assault on Port Arthur.

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The Russo-Japanese War on Land, 1904—1905.

CHAPTER I

CAUSES OF THE WAR

JAPAN had a general cause as well as a special cause of war. Generally speaking, she had a cause of war, because, on looking round the world, she saw herself the only independent power that was not European or European-derived, and she also saw that independence could be maintained by military power, and by that alone.

Her special cause of war lay in the facts that Korea was vital to her expansion, and that Korea was aimed at by Russia, whose great object was and is to obtain an ice-free harbour, whether in Korea or elsewhere. She was furious because, after she had captured Port Arthur in 1894, France, Germany, and Russia had compelled her to give it up, and the Siberian railway seriously alarmed her. In 1897 Russia secured the right of connecting that railway with the Pekin line at Port Niu-chuang (Ying-kou), and also a lease of Port Arthur (an ice-free port) and the right

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of building a line from Port Niu-chuang to that fortress.

Then came the Boxer outbreak, 1900, which gave Russia an excuse for occupying Manchuria, and the reply was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902, effectually forestalling any such combination as in 1895 had deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory. Japan then set to work to expel Russia from Manchuria; but in August, 1903, the railway to Port Arthur was completed and began pouring in troops. Even Northern Korea was aimed at, for a timber concession on the R. Ya-lu granted to a Russian was worked by a retired colonel and ex-soldiers, equipped with rifles. The Japanese Government protested, but the Siberian railway was improving and Russian vessels were arriving; and on December 11, 1903, Russia replied, offering to discuss with Japan the Korean question, but not the Manchurian question. The result was that on February 6, 1904, the Mikado broke off diplomatic relations. Neither side declared war till February 10, 1904. China, urged by the United States, proclaimed her neutrality, which, as well as her frontier, was generally respected throughout the war; as to Korea (independent since 1895), Japan speedily made a friendly arrangement with her. As a fact the war came two months too soon for Japan, and two years too soon for Russia.[1]

[1] Strategy and diplomacy should go hand-in-hand; in the case of Japan it was so, not in the case of Russia.

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CHAPTER II

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

RUSSIA had two naval bases—Port Arthur, open all the year, and Vladivostok, ice-bound for three months; they connected, *viâ* Tsushima, a fortified Japanese island. As Vladivostok was nearly isolated from the Pacific Ocean, Port Arthur was far the more important harbour. As to dock accommodation for repairs, Japan had the advantage.[1]

Korea was of value, because through it lay the road to Manchuria, which latter is mountainous in the south and east, and, except in the extreme south, covered with dense forest. In the west of the province, however, lie the rich plains of the Liao R. and the Sungari R. The climate is continental—*i.e.* hot in summer and cold in winter. As to diseases, both armies knew how to take care of themselves, and, as to the population, it objected only less to the Japanese than it did to the Russians. The Japanese, however, whilst objecting to war-correspondents, and, like their enemies, using cavalry very little for intelligence

[1] Note the bad dock accommodation at Port Arthur.

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work, obtained better information through their spies and the inhabitants; the Chunchuses (professional robbers), indeed, constantly raided the Russian communications.

The principal rivers in the theatre are the Ya-lu, the Sungari, the Amur, the Liao, all navigable when not frozen, and then they are sleigh-routes. Though villages are numerous, roads in the proper sense do not exist; it is possible to move along them with some ease during the winter, but in the rest of the year they are very difficult. The so-called roads are: (1) Port Arthur to Harbin; (2) the Mandarin road from Seoul *viâ* Liao-yang to Pekin; (3) cross-roads from Pi-tzu-wo and Ta-ku-shan into the Port Arthur road. Both found the roads serious evils in spite of coolies and Chinese carts, and, worse than all, the Japanese rolling-stock did not fit the Port Arthur to Harbin railway, the gauge on which had to be altered.

General de Négrier suggests that, to keep up a sufficient supply of ammunition and food, a modern army should possess refrigerating plant and portable railway *matériel*.

Supplies of various kinds were abundant in the theatre—in fact, all that was required except tea, sugar, flour, and oats—and thus the railways were left free for troops and ammunition. Mongolia supplied cattle, at Fu-shun and Yen-tai were coal-mines, whilst pigs, fowls, rice, vegetables, and

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crops of tall grain, called by various names, such as gaoljan, millet, sorghum, kao-liang, Indian corn, abounded.

The Japanese were based on their own country, Ujina being the principal dépôt, the Russians on Europe and on Siberia; and, though the Liao R. was a fair line of communication, the railways deserve first place. These must now be enumerated: (1) Chemulpo to Seoul; (2) incomplete line from Fusan to Seoul, which, during the war, the Japanese extended to Wiju; (3) Pekin to Hsin-min-tun, with a branch to Port Niu-chuang, which, under Belgian control, helped the Russians at first and the Japanese afterwards; (4) the all-important Siberian single-track line, which covers 6,000 miles from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, with branches to Strietensk, Khabarovsk, Port Arthur, Port Niu-chuang (Ying-kou), and Yen-tai. From Europe the quickest transit occupied fifteen days, but forty days between Warsaw and Mukden was not unusual. The difficulty of returning empty waggons was met by using them as fuel or as huts in Manchuria, new waggons built at Moscow costing less than returning the old ones; the engines, of course, were returned by means of sidings. Still, this long railway was always a weak point and inferior to the Japanese sea-transport; and the fact that rice was their staple food helped the Japanese commissariat.

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One special difficulty was Lake Baikal, round the southern end of which ran no railway in February, 1904. Across this great lake were used passenger-steamers, steam-ferries, ice-breakers, or sledges, according to the weather; but during a thaw crossing was almost impossible, and in that case troops marched round the southern end, supplies only being shipped across; while ice lasted the men marched across it. To get enough engines and waggons in the Far East, rails were, in February, 1904, laid across the ice of the lake, and by March 28 over 60 military trains were thus passed over. The extraordinarily able Russian Minister of Public Traffic, Prince Khilkof (Chilkow), did much (in spite of the prevalent corruption) to improve the transport, and on September 25, 1904, finished the Circum-Baikal line; and by the end of 1904 the Trans-Baikal system ran nine or ten trains daily each way, and up to the same date the railway had carried 410,000 men, 93,000 horses, 1,000 guns, etc. (a European Russian army corps requires 267 railway trains). It should be added that the railway was well guarded in Manchuria, and that every possible precaution for the health of the men *en route* was taken. The fact that most of the food could be locally obtained was no doubt a great help.

N.B.—From Vladivostok to Port Arthur is 625 miles, and from Wiju to Fusan is 400 miles;

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the war took place in neither belligerent's territory; the Russians laid down several light railways during the operations; a telegraph line skirted each railway, and ran from Seoul to Gensan.

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CHAPTER III

THE FORCES

IN February, 1904, the war strength of Japan stood thus:

A. Standing Army—	
(1) Active	180,000
(2) First Reserve . . .	200,000
B. Second Reserve or Kobi (Landwehr)	200,000
C. Trained Conscript Reserve . .	50,000
D. Trained Home or National Army (Landsturm)	220,000
Total	850,000
Besides Untrained Conscript Reserve	250,000
and Untrained National Army	4,000,000

The above numbers are stated in the British Official Account; but we may eliminate the untrained men, and, confining ourselves to classes A and B, we may state the effectives as 257,000 infantry, 13,000 cavalry, and 870 guns. The

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standing Army consisted of the Imperial Guard, 12 divisions (each containing 11,400 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 36 guns), 2 cavalry brigades 3,000 men altogether), and two artillery brigades (180 guns). If to this standing Army be added 13 Kobi brigades, dépôt troops, and the garrison of Formosa Island, we shall arrive at the numbers stated above.[1] During the war four new divisions were raised. It should be noted that the division is the highest unit, that there are no corps d'armée, that a battery consists of six guns (note that Divisions 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 had only mountain-guns), and that lines of communication were held by troops from classes B, C, and D. The supply system was, shortly, as follows: A private carried one day's rations and two days' emergency rations; then came the regimental transport carrying one day's supplies; then the divisional supply column carrying four days' rations; and then the magazine column, which filled from railhead or other dépôt, and to this latter the supplies came from the sea-base.

The system was much the same as in Germany, the Emperor being Commander-in-Chief. Marshal Yamagata became Chief of the General Staff after Marshal Oyama assumed chief command in the field. Oyama was much aided by his talented Chief of Staff, Baron Kodama. The training and "moral" were excellent, the war

[1] See note, No. 1, p. 108.

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popular, the initiative was inculcated, and the men's bravery was hereditary—in short, they retained the virtues of barbarism without the defects of civilisation. The infantry, armed with modern rifles, believed in fire-action both in attack and on defence; they knew how to use ground, employing artificial cover even on the offensive, and learnt how to conduct night-attacks; they went into action carrying 250 rounds, and moved rapidly from cover to cover. The cavalry, few and badly mounted, were the weakest point; the inferiority of the horses accounts for the defective reconnaissance work, for the absence of raids, and for the want of mobility displayed by the field-guns.[1] The artillery, having some quick-firing guns not quite up to date, was not equal to the infantry, and neither side at first possessed protective shields. It will be observed that the victor possessed inferior numbers, but Japan has since seen fit to increase her Army.

The Japanese Navy, administered on British lines, included seven battleships, as also did the Russian Navy in the Far East; but the former were superior in quality, and in all other vessels and in merchant-steamers Japan had the advantage. The Russian main fleet was at Port Arthur, four cruisers were at Vladivostok, and one cruiser and a gunboat at Chemulpo.

The resources of Russia, both in money and

[1] See note, No. 2, p. 108.

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in men, were far greater, although local conditions favoured the Japanese, whose base, too, was nearer. The total of Russia's trained land forces stood at 4,500,000; in Eastern Siberia there were, in February, 1904, two Siberian army corps. The strength of a European Russian corps was 28,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 124 guns; but a Siberian corps was nothing like so well organised and had no cavalry, nor was there any divisional cavalry. The cavalry consisted almost entirely of Cossacks, each division containing 3,400 men and 12 horse-artillery guns in two batteries; the Russian field battery numbered 8 guns, and the horse-artillery battery 6 guns.

The combatant troops of Russia in the Far East in February, 1904, probably numbered:

(1) Field troops, 106,000—*i.e.* 92,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 196 guns, 2,700 engineers;

(2) Fortress troops, 7,700;

(3) Railway troops, 11,400;

(4) Frontier guards along the railway, 23,400, with 48 guns. Total, 148,500 men, 244 guns, and 8 machine-guns; besides 10,000 men with 32 guns *en route* from Europe (they arrived about February 14).

The above figures are stated in the British Official Account, but the numbers do not agree with those stated in the German Official Account. In any case, the units were not up to strength,

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and were scattered over a large area; and the British Official Account concludes that on February 8, 1904, the available field troops totalled only 70,000 infantry, 4,200 cavalry, and 196 guns, and these were posted mainly near Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with a portion at Harbin.

The infantry, obstinate as ever, had forgotten the lessons of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–8, believed not in fire-action, but in shock tactics —*i.e.* the bayonet, "without sufficient use of skirmishers and without enough fire-preparation" (G.O.A.), in spite of their modern rifles. Initiative was discouraged, units were mixed up, simultaneous flank and frontal attacks were not suggested, reserves were too much held back. Like their opponents, they carried 250 rounds. As to cavalry, there were few trained horsemen, hence bad reconnoitring, for the Cossacks were poor soldiers, untrained, and unable either to read or to write. As to artillery, it was insufficient in number and not up to date (Russia was re-arming with quick-firing guns, superior to her opponent's); reserve artillery was unwisely formed, guns were not massed, and the practice was inferior.[1] The staff was not properly trained, and the Russians generally, who never take kindly to the offensive, lacked "moral" for this unpopular war.

The supreme command was in an unsatisfactory position. In Manchuria and round Port Arthur

[1] The Russians had some few mountain guns.

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it was vested by land and sea in Admiral Alexeiev, the Governor of the Far East; in the Amur district it was vested in General Linevich; at Port Arthur itself General Stessel commanded. On February 20, 1904, a very able general, Kuropatkin, was named Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army, and arrived at Liao-yang on March 27; whilst the naval command was transferred to Admiral Makarov. On October 25, 1904, Alexeiev was recalled; but up to that date the supreme command was unsatisfactory.

Owing to immense distances and to transport difficulties the mobilisation proceeded slowly. On February 10 there began to mobilise the troops in the Amur district, near Port Arthur and in Manchuria; on the 15th, west of Lake Baikal, the Siberian reserves and the Asiatic Cossack reserves; and after the battle of the Ya-lu (May 1) certain European Russian troops. By the middle of February the Russians had 45,000 field troops near Vladivostok, 8,000 at Harbin, 9,100 near Hai-cheng, 11,000 (including General Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade) on the lower Ya-lu, and 22,500 near Port Arthur.

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CHAPTER IV

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

FOR Japan, an island, the first essential was absolute control of the sea, though this by itself would not decide the war—*e.g.* Waterloo had to seal the work of Nelson. The Mikado's great aims were to secure Korea, to regain Port Arthur, and to repel the Russian advance. Politically, therefore, he had to take the offensive; and in doing so his primary objective was the Russian Army, his secondary Port Arthur. Assuming the control of the sea to be gained, Japan would possess a re-entrant from Vladivostok round to Port Arthur; and strategy lays it down that, when an offensive army acts from such a zone of concentration, it should strike as far back as possible on the hostile lines of communication. In this case that would mean an advance *viâ* Vladivostok (compare Moreau's movement in 1800 from Schaffhausen); but against this course were the following facts: (1) Vladivostok was fortified; (2) the coast was ice-bound till April. Consequently, just as Moltke defied theory when, in 1870, he moved his Third Army first, so did the Japanese

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defy theory by deciding on the Port Arthur line, because (1) base harbours could in that region be secured, (2) Korea would be protected, (3) retreat would be easier. Even before gaining complete command of the sea, Japan obtained control over Korea, and her subsequent strategy in directing a converging movement against Kuropatkin was conducted on the lines of Moltke in Bohemia, 1866, except that, as they had originally underrated the Russian numbers, this converging movement was not conducted in sufficient strength, and Major Bird remarks that the simultaneous effort against Port Arthur and Kuropatkin rendered the Japanese numbers weak in both places.[1]

Local weakness (an instance of defective strategic deployment) and Japanese rapidity forced the defensive on Russia, who indeed was surprised. Being in the salient, she had, according to theory, two courses of action—either to stop in the salient and act on the Napoleonic principle of interior lines (*i.e.* contain one part of the enemy and crush the other), or to retire out of the salient altogether, say, to Harbin. Her actual original plan, never carried out, was to mass near Vladivostok, Hai-cheng, and Port Arthur, whilst reinforcements would gather at Harbin; and it is said that Kuropatkin and Linevich contemplated movements like the celebrated operations of Grant and Sherman at the close of the American Civil War; but the command of the sea was wanting.

[1] The Japanese double primary objective was bad, because they were not numerous enough.

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Unfortunately, Alexeiev and Kuropatkin took opposite views—the former holding that, no matter how the fleet was used[1] (*i.e.* whether or not it was a fleet *in esse* = intact fleet, capable of damaging the enemy's transports), Port Arthur was vital, and must be protected to the extent of Kuropatkin's power; it was Alexeiev who mixed up units, Alexeiev who reinforced the Eastern Detachment (compare the detachment sent to Dundee in Natal, 1899, owing to political pressure), Alexeiev who shut up field troops in Port Arthur. On the other hand, Kuropatkin held that, if the fleet were not a fleet *in esse*, Port Arthur ceased to be of military importance; that his proper course was to retard the Japanese advance, and not to fight battles like the Ya-lu, but to go on slowly retreating, as the Russians had retreated in 1812, to the exhaustion of their antagonist. The General may have been right, but he was not allowed a free hand—he was forced to attempt to relieve Port Arthur; and the German General Staff considers that the parallel with 1812 breaks down, because in 1904 there was no patriotic population to oppose the invader.

Students should compare this war with the American Civil War, Federals and Japanese commanding the sea, Confederates and Russians being in a large salient; and with 1866, Prussians and Japanese moving on concentric lines, Austrians and Russians on interior lines.

[1] See note, No. 3, p. 108.

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CHAPTER V

EVENTS OF THE WAR UP TO MAY 6

THE Japanese, as fully informed of their enemy's naval arrangements as the latter were ignorant of the Japanese, embarked troops on the 6th at Sasebo for Chemulpo, with an escort formed by Admiral Togo's fleet, whose object was to seal up the Russian main fleet at Port Arthur. Cutting the telegraph cable between Port Arthur and Chemulpo, and detaching (1) Admiral Kamamura's squadron to the Straits of Korea to hold the Vladivostok squadron, and (2) another squadron with part of the 12th Division to Chemulpo, the Japanese Admiral proceeded towards Port Arthur, which he sighted on the 8th. At that place lay the Russian main fleet under Admiral Stark, ignorant of the existence of war; and on that night Togo's torpedoes seriously damaged two large battleships. Next day he opened fire on the fortress, whilst the Russian fleet retired into the inner harbour; but his efforts to block the mouth of the harbour by sinking ballast proved vain. His great aim was

February. February 8. Togo at Port Arthur.

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to capture the enemy's vessels without suffering injury himself.

At Chemulpo, meantime, the Japanese squadron closed on the two Russian vessels there (ignorant of the existence of war), and they, being unable to escape, sank themselves, their crews taking refuge on neutral men-of-war in the harbour. Part of the 12th Division (2,500 men) at once landed and occupied Seoul, seizing the telegraph office as was the Japanese custom; other troops landed at Gensan and Fusan, thus securing a retreat if it became necessary. About the 21st a small detachment from Seoul pushed on to Pingyang, driving back a few Cossacks; and, on the 23rd, Korea made a treaty permitting Japanese troops to pass through her territory. The Korean roads were so terrible that it was obviously wise to land the rest of the 1st Army at Chinampo, which would be ice-free by March 10. This army, under General Kuroki, consisted of the Imperial Guard, the 2nd Division, and the 12th Division, and numbered 36,000 infantry, 1,350 cavalry, 108 guns, and 20 howitzers; and it was to cover its Chinampo landing that Togo tried to block up the Port Arthur harbour.

March. On the 8th the distinguished Admiral Makarov superseded Stark, but even he could not act offensively; and so the 2nd and Guard Divisions, on the 11th, left Japan for Chinampo, whilst the mass of the 12th Division moved north-west

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to Pingyang (the 18th), Kobi troops holding the line of communications. Under cover of the 12th Division, the Guards (18th to 25th) and the 2nd Division (24th to 27th) landed at Chinampo. All the 1st Army then collected on Pingyang.

The engineers, in intense cold, repaired the fearful roads to Anju, and on the 14th the thaw set in, and all the work had to be repeated. On the 20th, Kuroki started for Anju at about four miles a day, having to deal with 2,000 Cossacks. The 12th Division marched on the right, the Guard Division in the centre, the 2nd Division on the left, repulsing the Cossacks. The Japanese General, learning that the enemy was entrenching on the lower Ya-lu, decided (in order to avoid any separation) to move his whole force by the single road Anju — Syanchyon — Wiju, except a weak detachment which was to make for Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu, and thus cover the right of the army against Cossack raids.

The country was poor, vehicles stuck fast, pack-horses and Korean coolies had to fetch supplies from the immediate base, Chinampo; then these failed, and supplies had to be landed at various points—*e.g.* Rikaho, on the coast—and pushed up to the army. The men could march only two abreast. During this advance some Cossacks were met with—*e.g.* on the 28th, Mishchenko's Cossacks fought a dismounted action at Tiessu.

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All this month of March, Togo, at Port Arthur, was perforce inactive.

Meantime, on the Russian side, the Viceroy Alexeiev had moved to An-tung, on the lower Ya-lu, Kashtalinski's III. East Siberian Rifle Division and Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, where the latter crossed the river and acted as already described. The Russian Headquarters also made changes in their strategic concentration—*e.g.* they despatched the majority of the Vladivostok forces to the Manchurian Field Army, leaving, however, some field troops near that fortress, and other field troops in the Kuantung Peninsula, near Port Arthur; they also gave up assembling reinforcements at Harbin, and brought them up at once to the Manchurian Field Army.

The German Official Account suggests that, if the Russians had massed more to the south—say, near Ta-shih-chiao—they could have hampered Japanese landing operations; but, perchance, such a move would have been dangerous, with Kuroki coming in from Korea. As a fact, the Russians resolved to concentrate the Manchurian Field Army near Liao-yang and wait till August for European reinforcements to give them a crushing superiority. To this plan Kuropatkin, who arrived on the 27th, gave his adhesion. As to Kuroki, he was merely to be contained on the Ya-lu. The fact is, the Russians fully expected a Japanese army to land at the mouth of the Liao Ho.

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Admiral Makarov, bent on battle, issued on the 13th from the harbour, and his flagship, himself, and his crew were destroyed by a Japanese floating mine. Henceforth the Port Arthur fleet for a considerable period did nothing. The Vladivostok squadron, also issuing, sank two Japanese transports and one troopship near Gensan, and then returned, pursued by Kamamura. Henceforth this squadron for a considerable period did nothing.

April.

April 13. Death of Makaroy.

On the 4th Kuroki's leading cavalry reached the Ya-lu, south of Wiju, and on the 1st the mass of his army left Anju in this order: 12th, Guard, and 2nd Divisions, the heavy rains retarding the march; but yet the head of the 12th Division reached Wiju on the 14th.

Since the 3rd all the Russian cavalry had retired to the west bank, and thus the river, a formidable obstacle without bridges, screened the Japanese movements during the whole of April. The Ya-lu is liable to floods, and in its lower reaches becomes broad and deep and quite unfordable, except at one or two places above Suikuchin, and as it splits up it forms several islands, and near its mouth it is a mile broad. The western bank commands the eastern bank.

The Russian Eastern Detachment held the heights near An-tung; and their main difficulty arose from the facts that the Japanese might land west of the Ya-lu mouth, that they thus

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had to make their right very strong, and that they could not in consequence utilise the Hu-shan heights because these heights were on the other side of the Ai Ho. Of these heights the southern point, Tiger Hill, was held only by a detachment of trained scouts. The Japanese knew the ground from their experience of 1894. The chief error of the Russians was in retiring their cavalry over the river; they should have withdrawn them east of the river in a north-easterly direction, whence they could have reconnoitred. As it was, the Japanese moved unperceived.

On the 5th Kuropatkin ordered General Kashtalinski, who at that time commanded the Eastern Detachment (III. East Siberian Rifle Division and Mishchenko's Cossacks) to "reconnoitre across the river, worry the enemy, employ native spies, report constantly, repair the road to Feng-huang-cheng, and connect with Madritov." Such is a sample of the minute and interfering orders, fatal to all initiative, which perpetually issued from Russian Headquarters.

After the 7th daily encounters took place on the Ya-lu and on its islands, and everything pointed to the presence of a strong Japanese force. In fact, by the 20th all Kuroki's Army had reached Wiju, having taken one month for the 125 miles of wretched road from Pingyang, and being based on Rikaho, whilst the original line of communications *viâ* Pingyang was relied

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upon in case of retreat. Up the mouth of the Ya-lu appeared a Japanese flotilla under Nakagava. Meantime the Japanese 2nd Army (1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions, and 1st Artillery Brigade) had on the 16th reached Chinampo, and there awaited the result of the Ya-lu operations; and all the time Togo and Kamamura watched the hostile vessels.

On the 20th Kuroki stood from Wiju southwards in this order: 12th Division on the right, Guards in the centre, 2nd Division on the left. Outposts were close to the river, reconnoitring was active, spies were numerous, and every care was taken for secrecy, *e.g.* screens of gaoljan or millet were put up, whereas the Russians freely exposed themselves. On the same day the right flank detachment reached Chyangsyong.

The Russians received various reports of varying credibility as to the movements and intentions of the Japanese 1st Army; but the only real reconnoitring work across the Ya-lu, *i.e.* on the eastern side, was done on the extreme Russian left by Colonel Madritov's flying column of cavalry, which, starting from Huai-jen-hsien, and intending to raid Kuroki's line of communications, had, before the 21st, crossed the Ya-lu near Chosan. On the 22nd the new commander of the Eastern Detachment, General Zasulich, arrived on the Ya-lu, and thus disposed his troops: On his right, Mishchenko, with 1,100 Cossacks, 2,400

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infantry, and 14 guns, watched the coast from Pi-tzu-wo to the mouth of the Ya-lu; in his right centre, which extended from An-tung, 10 miles southwards along the western bank, Kashtalinski had 2,500 infantry, 400 mounted scouts, 8 guns, and 8 machine-guns, with outposts in Kanshi Island; in his left centre, which extended 7 miles from south-west of Chiu-lien-cheng across the Ai Ho to Tiger Hill, General Trusov had 5,200 infantry, 240 mounted scouts, and 16 guns; on his left, Colonel Kartsev had 1,200 cavalry and 8 mountain-guns north of An-ping-ho, and 1,000 infantry at An-ping-ho itself in support. The General Reserve of 5,200 infantry and 16 guns was at Tien-tzu. The line of communications and of retreat ran to Liao-yang *vid* Feng-huang-cheng. The total numbers stood at 16,300 infantry, 2,300 cavalry, 640 mounted scouts, 62 guns, and 8 machine-guns, holding a front of 172 miles. It should be added that reinforcements had during this month reached the Eastern Detachment.

If Kuroki wished to cross out of range, he must bridge above Wiju, and so he decided to seize the Hu-shan, and then to cross by Kyuri and Oseki Islands and fall on the Russian left centre. The Japanese bridging-train was not enough for the Ya-lu and its channels; they therefore collected junks and shipped *matériel* from Japan. Naval demonstrations were then successfully under-

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taken on Kuroki's left to give the impression of a crossing below Wiju, and therefore it was that the Russian reserve was behind the right centre.

On the night of the 25th to the 26th Kintei Island was captured by troops of the 2nd Division, as also was Kyuri Island by troops of the Guard. The result was that the weak Russian outposts on Tiger Hill and in Oseki Island evacuated their positions; but the Russians still held Kanshi Island. On this day the Japanese cut telegraphic connexion between Zasulich and his extreme left under Kartsev; and Kuroki, fully informed of his enemy's position and strength, including Madritov's squadrons east of the Ya-lu, issued at 10 a.m. on the 28th his orders for attack on May 1.

On his right the 12th Division was to cross at Suikuchin on the night of the 29th to the 30th, and move down the right bank to cover the passage of the rest of the army, sending a very weak detachment on its extreme right to threaten the Russian retreat; on his left, the 2nd Division guns and the howitzers were, on the 30th, to be in position on Kintei Island, and the 2nd Division itself was to pass through Kyuri Island and Oseki Island, and thence north of Tiger Hill into the island of Chukodai on May 1; in his centre the Guards were to follow the 2nd Division, and to take post between the two other

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divisions. The General Reserve was to occupy Kyuri Island. The total of Kuroki's forces is stated as 40,000, of whom 33,000 were infantry, with 108 guns and 20 howitzers; these numbers are probably exaggerated, there being no Kobi brigades present, and indeed the 2nd and 12th Divisions (throughout the war) never had any Kobi brigades. Kuroki obviously intended an enveloping attack, but it was after all a frontal attack, because the Russians had in the interval extended their left centre as far as Ching-kou.

Meantime Zasulich had received numerous telegrams from Kuropatkin, especially one stating that, though his duty was to resist, he was not to fight a decisive action on the Ya-lu against superior forces—*i.e.* he was to act as a containing force; but, unfortunately for him, Alexeiev urged desperate resistance, and his intelligence was not at all reliable, though his staff drew pretty accurate conclusions. On the 28th Trusov fell ill, and Kashtalinski took his place with the left centre, which, without any cavalry, now held a position 6 miles long from Chiu-lien-cheng through Ma-kou and Po-te-tien-tzu to Ching-kou. This was the force that was assailed; and, though Zasulich overestimated the enemy's numbers, it was not really reinforced, so effectual was Kuroki's feinting on his left.

By the 29th Kuroki had laid six bridges (there were ten finally), of which we may mention

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(1) bridge due west of Wiju leading to Kintei Island (bridge "a" in the German Official Account, Sketch 5)—this bridge was a blind; (2) two bridges ("A" and "B" in the British Official Account, Map III.) north of Wiju leading to Kyuri Island. The Russian fire on all these did little damage.

April 30. 12th Division crosses the Ya-lu.

On the 30th the 12th Division crossed at Suikuchin and marched towards the Ai Ho, the Russians at An-ping-ho retiring (note the consequent isolation of the 12th Division, and compare Beresford's isolation at the battle of Toulouse, 1814). Meantime the 2nd Division guns and the howitzers, carefully screened, were got into position on Kintei Island; water kept down the dust they made, and their fire was directed by the map. They then bombarded the Chiu-lien-cheng position in order to cover the march of the 12th Division; it was 36 field-guns and 20 howitzers against 14 guns (two guns being on the extreme Russian left at Ching-kou). The Russian guns were soon silenced, and the Japanese gunners then searched the whole Russian position and the ground behind it, making good practice, and producing great moral effect though little actual damage (compare little actual loss inflicted by the Russian guns at Plevna, 1877). The object, however, was attained—the 12th Division moved unmolested.

Bridge "E" in the British Official Account, Map

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III., leading from Kyuri Island to Oseki Island, and bridge "F" in the same map, leading from Oseki Island to Tiger Hill, were then constructed; May. and by 5 a.m. on May 1 the 2nd Division and Guards had crossed both these bridges, and some of the 2nd Division guns had been in the night ferried across from Kintei Island to Chukodai Island, but none of the howitzers.

Thus, early on May 1, the Japanese position was:

Left Wing: Howitzers and some 2nd Division guns in Kintei Island; 2nd Division and some of its guns near Chukodai.

Centre: Guards on the right of 2nd Division as far north as Li-tzu-yuan, with guns near Tiger Hill.

Right Wing: 12th Division, joined by the weak right-flank detachment which, from Chyangsyong, had moved down the east bank of the Ya-lu, north of Li-tzu-yuan, with guns at that place. Reserve in Kyuri Island.

On the Russian side there had been up to April 29 complete ignorance of Kuroki's intentions; indeed Zasulich and Kuropatkin really supposed that the Japanese would sweep round far to the north, say, through Kuan-tien-chen; they did not regard the Japanese crossing at Suikuchin as serious. On April 30, however, Zasulich began to suspect the truth.

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The Russian position west of the Ai Ho, fordable everywhere, was strong, rising sharply from the river and with a good field of fire; but there were no lateral communications, and of artificial obstacles there were not any, and even the trenches were not first-class, *e.g.* they had no overhead cover. Worse still, Kashtalinski, who held the Ai Ho position, had only the numbers already stated.

BATTLE OF THE YA-LU, MAY 1

At 6 a.m. the guns of the 2nd Division and the howitzers, using indirect fire, opened, followed soon by the Guard and 12th Division artillery; the few Russian guns could not reply. At 7 a.m. the three Japanese divisions moved forward towards the Ai Ho, coming under rifle-fire from the hostile trenches. At 8 a.m. Kuroki issued orders to assault, and, covered by gun-fire, the Japanese gained ground by long rushes, suffering heavily as they forded the Ai Ho.

Observing the enemy's great strength, Zasulich directed Kashtalinski to retire behind the Han-tu-ho-tzu brook, whither he called part of the reserve from Tien-tzu with a battery. The Japanese idea had been that the 12th Division should envelop the Russian left; but Kashtalinski's extension to Ching-kou caused the attack to be a frontal one. The Japanese, after fording the Ai Ho, met a fierce resistance, but at 9.15 a.m.

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the enemy fell back. All this time the Russians at An-tung and at Tien-tzu, detained by the Japanese flotilla in the river, did nothing. As to the Japanese guns at this hour, two batteries of the 2nd Division had got across the river to Chiu-lien-cheng, the others being near Chukodai; the Guard artillery had crossed the Ai Ho to Ma-kou; the 12th Division artillery had also crossed the river to its right bank; the howitzers, of course, remained in Kintei Island.

From 9.15 a.m. to 1 p.m. the Japanese halted, partly owing to fatigue and hunger, partly owing to joy (G.O.A.), and partly to allow the 12th Division's turning movement to develop; thus the Russians easily got into their second position —*i.e.* behind the Han-tu-ho-tzu brook.

Meantime, on the extreme Russian left (Po-te-tien-tzu and Ching-kou), which was not properly connected with Chiu-lien-cheng, Colonel Gromov, threatened by the superior enemy on both flanks, lost 6 guns (*i.e.* the 6 guns which, with 8 others, had been silenced on April 30; they were part of the 3rd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade) and retired westwards towards Lao-fang-kou, and thence, passing north through Liu-chia-kou, gained the road to Feng-huang-cheng—he may have gone due west from Lao-fang-kou into the Feng-huang-cheng road (on this point the German and British Official Accounts differ).

The right or northern wing of the 12th Division

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never paused, though moving but slowly; on the other hand, the left or southern wing of that division and the Guard and the 2nd Divisions did not move again till 1 p.m.—the 2nd Division on An-tung. The General Reserve came up to Chiu-lien-cheng.

Action at Ha-ma-tang.

Kashtalinski, having found his second position, *i.e.* behind the Han-tu-ho-tzu brook, untenable, because Colonel Gromov's retirement enabled the Japanese 12th Division to menace its left or northern flank, fell back towards Ha-ma-tang and a height ("192" in Sketch 5 of the German Official Account; "570" in Map IV. of the British Official Account) east of that village—thither also came up troops and a battery from the reserve at Tien-tzu; but the Japanese 12th Division, pouring down the road from Ching-kou about 1 p.m., brought on a severe action. All the Japanese then at 2 p.m. converged on Ha-ma-tang and the above-named height, inflicting heavy losses. To open the one road of escape westwards one battalion of the 11th Rifle Regiment executed a gallant and successful charge (not recorded in the British Official Account), opening a way by which the routed Russians could flee westwards, though in utter disorder and losing many prisoners. The cause of this disaster was not so much Gromov's retirement—for that was compulsory—as his failing to inform Kashtalinski.

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The skilful feints by the Japanese flotilla had detained the Russian right centre at An-tung, and so early as 9.30 a.m. Zasulich directed all his troops there to retire, which they began to do about 12 noon, making for Tang-shan-cheng on the Feng-huang-cheng road. Their retreat was secured by the resistance at Ha-ma-tang, and on their way west of that place they were joined by other parts of the Eastern Detachment, and had to hold off the Japanese, who by this time were threatening the main Russian line of retreat. The pursuit was not pressed, and on May 2 the Russians reached Feng-huang-cheng.

The losses on April 30 and May 1 were: Japanese, 867 killed and wounded; Russians, 2,193 (3,000 in the British Official Account) killed, wounded and missing, 21 guns, 8 machine-guns, and, at Feng-huang-cheng, large stores.

Meantime, on the right, Mishchenko's Cossacks from Ta-ku-shan were also making for Feng-huang-cheng; on the left the An-ping-ho infantry retired on the same place, and the Cossacks (not Madritov) on Kuan-tien-chen (Kuan-tien-cheng).

Kuropatkin, having been informed of the battle on the Ya-lu, pushed troops forward to Lien-shan-kuan, halfway between Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng, and to Sai-ma-chi. To this last place he directed General Rennenkampf with 2,500 Cossacks, 2,000 infantry, and 14 guns; for the Russian was apprehensive of a Japanese

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movement round the left (northern) flank of the Eastern Detachment.

On May 4, as the Japanese began to press, Zasulich withdrew his Eastern Detachment behind the eastern Fen-shui-ling Pass, near Lien-shan-kuan (N.B.—There are three Fen-shui-ling Passes: (1) S.E. of Hai-cheng, also called Da-ling or Tae-ling; (2) the middle one, east of Hai-cheng; (3) the eastern one as above). As to the Japanese, the 1st Army halted at An-tung, and on May 3 the cavalry alone pursued. Not before May 5 did the main body move, because the ground was difficult, and because Supreme Headquarters wanted to get the 2nd Army landed, and feared Kuroki might be attacked by superior numbers from Liao-yang. But Kuroki, on his own initiative, desired to occupy Feng-huang-cheng, which he did on May 6; and by the 11th his whole army was billeted at that place, full sanitary precautions being taken, especially against beri-beri, and coolies and Chinese carts fetching up the supplies from An-tung, whence Kuroki soon afterwards laid down a tramway. The 1st Army remained at Feng-huang-cheng from May 6 to June 23.

Tactical Comments.—(1) On the Japanese side great moral effect of a victory gained by an Asiatic over a European Power; Kuroki's plan was too elaborate for the strength of his enemy, and he did not pursue; he made good use of the

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Ya-lu as a natural screen, and of artificial screens; his feinting on his left was skilful, but his lines were too dense—he learnt better afterwards; he no doubt isolated his 12th Division, but General Ian Hamilton thinks he would have done better to isolate it still more by pushing it more round by the north against the Russian line of retreat; the Japanese guns were well concealed. (2) On the Russian side the numbers were too numerous for mere observation, and too few for battle; Zasulich was hampered by Kuropatkin's minute orders, and probably he should have retired before April 30, but even as it was the retreat on May 1 would have been fairly safe if only Colonel Gromov had held out; the abandonment of the strong point, Tiger Hill, can be explained only by reference to the order that he should fight only a "containing" action; Zasulich foolishly adopted the cordon system of defence; the men were too crowded in the trenches, the artillery was not well concealed, and there was no active defence; the infantry trenches were visible and the soldiers bad shots, and they employed volley-fire, which is bad, except in night-attacks. (3) This passage illustrates once more the necessity of using stratagem in forcing a defended river, and the fact that it is not possible permanently to hold any river against a determined enemy; it should be compared with Wellington's passage of the Nive in 1813.

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It is convenient to insert here the raid of Madritov's Cossacks, April 25 to May 31. He established connexion with Kartsev's cavalry on the western side of the Ya-lu; but, instead of resolutely reconnoitring Kuroki's advance, the Cossack leader indulged in a sweeping movement from Chosan round on Anju, expecting to cut the enemy's line of communications, which, however, had previously been transferred by means of sea-power first to Rikaho and afterwards to An-tung. Nor was the Russian successful at Anju, whence he was repulsed by some Japanese, and on May 31 we find him back on the Ya-lu, north of Chosan. His force was too weak,[1] and his raid useless.

April 25 to May 31. Raid of Madritov.

POSITIONS OF THE RUSSIANS IN THE FAR EAST, APRIL 30

Field troops:

1. At Liao-yang and southwards towards Port Niu-chuang, under Kuropatkin (Army of Manchuria): Parts of I. S.A.C., II. S.A.C., X. A.C., and XVII. A.C., with Rennenkampf's Trans-Baikal Cossacks—*i.e.* 38,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.
2. Near Port Niu-chuang, under Kondratovich (Army of Manchuria): 11,000 infantry and 900 cavalry.
3. At Harbin: 15,000 infantry (Army of Manchuria).

[1] Madritov had 500 Cossacks.

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4. Eastern Detachment on the Ya-lu, under Zasulich (Army of Manchuria): Parts of II. S.A.C. and III. S.A.C., with Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cossacks—*i.e.* 16,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.
5. At Port Arthur and in Kuantung Peninsula, under General Stessel (Army of Manchuria): Part of III. S.A.C., etc.—*i.e.* 26,000 infantry.
6. Ussuri troops near Vladivostok, under General Linevich (not in Army of Manchuria): 15,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.
7. Madritov's detached cavalry force east of Chosan.

The total should have been 160,000, but in reality it was only 98,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry with about 400 guns. Besides these field troops there were 23,000 Frontier Guards with 48 guns and 8 machine-guns, 11,000 railway troops, and 7,600 fortress troops. It will be noted that the Viceroy Alexeiev had mixed up the units.

The Russian vessels at Port Arthur and at Vladivostok were watched by Togo and by Kamamura. The 1st Japanese Army was at Wiju, and the 2nd Japanese Army in transports at Chinampo.

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CHAPTER VI

NAN SHAN

THE Japanese had next to deal with Port Arthur, because it was politically important and contained a fleet which might be joined by the Baltic fleet. For these reasons they decided to besiege it and to capture the vessels; otherwise it would, from a military point of view, have been better to mask the place To isolate this fortress the 2nd Army, under Oku (1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions and 1st Artillery Brigade), then off Chinampo, was to land south-west of Pi-tzu-wo. To cover the landing, Togo, early in May, again tried to block up the Port Arthur harbour, and took all other naval measures necessary, and by May 13 all the army had landed unopposed.[1] The Japanese Admiral, however, on May 15, lost two battleships through floating mines.

Landing of 2nd Army

At the same period the Russians were thus posted: Zasulich with the Eastern Detachment on Lien-shan-kuan, with Rennenkampf's Cossacks on his left at Sai-ma-chi, and with Mishchenko's Cossacks on his right at Hsiu-yen; Stakelberg's

[1] Stessel should have opposed 2nd Army's landing.

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I. S.A.C. at Ying-kou—Ta-shih-chiao—Kai-ping; Stessel round Port Arthur, with 30,000 men. Kuropatkin, always in favour of Harbin and waiting for reinforcements, wanted even then to evacuate Liao-yang; but he was restrained by the opposite views of the Viceroy, Alexeiev.

On May 16 Oku, moving westwards and driving in some of Stessel's troops, occupied the railway north of Chin-chou, and thus isolated Port Arthur. He then posted part of his force facing the Russian lines at Chin-chou and Nan Shan, and part of his force at Pu-lan-tien facing northwards, and thus waited for the 5th Division. He was also protected by naval demonstrations off Kai-ping and by the landing of the 10th Division at Ta-ku-shan, May 19.

Landing of 4th Army.

From May 15–23 took place the disembarkation of the 5th Division and of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; and then Oku decided to gain a fresh base at Ta-lien-wan and Dalny, for which purpose he must carry the Nan Shan position. He therefore, on May 23, brought his troops into these positions: Left Wing: 3rd Division, south of Mt. Sampson and east of Nan Shan; Right Wing: 4th Division plus one-third of 1st Artillery Brigade, north of Chin-chou and west of railway; Centre: 1st Division, west of Mt. Sampson, as a link between the two other divisions; two-thirds of the 1st Artillery Brigade in rear of the left wing. At Pu-lan-tien stood the 5th Division and the 1st

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Cavalry Brigade. The total of Oku's force was 38,000 men, with 198 guns. Oku took every care to conceal his dispositions.

THE RUSSIAN NAN SHAN POSITION

Nan Shan is a narrow isthmus of strategic importance, and on it stands a circle of hills 300 feet high. It was very strong by nature and art (barbed wire) in the north, still stronger in the east, where were mines, searchlights, barbed wire, and a gunboat (safe from naval attack by reason of mines closing up the bay) in Ta-lien Bay; on both fronts was a good field of fire; on the western side, though there was barbed wire, the position was not so formidable.

The Russians worked hard at the redoubts and batteries and trenches, searchlights swept the front by night, water was abundant, and there was a good view. The defects were lack of concealment, a difficulty in counter-attacking, and neglect on the western side; the fact is that Nan Shan was not a strong position unless the defender held the sea. The total of the Russian force under General Fock was 16,000 men (mainly of the IV. E.S.R.D.), with 114 guns; of this force a detachment of 400 men held Chin-chou, and of the total number only 3,000 were actually engaged.

Oku was to be helped by four gunboats in

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Chin-chou Bay, and on May 24 he issued orders for attacking next day, all three divisions moving up under cover of darkness, and the 1st Artillery Brigade (minus the 13th Regiment with the 4th Division) joining the 3rd Division. Two reasons postponed the attack till the 26th—(1) no gun-boats arrived; (2) the 4th Division failed in the first assault on Chin-chou. The naval flotilla having arrived in the evening, Oku directed an assault at 4.30 a.m., May 26.

BATTLE OF NAN SHAN, MAY 26

It was first necessary to capture Chin-chou; but the second assault by the 4th Division in a tempest at midnight (May 25–26) failed. Next, however, Prince Fushimi, commanding the 1st Division, on his own initiative, sent troops against the eastern gate of Chin-chou, and this third assault succeeded at 5.20 a.m., somewhat delaying, however, the 1st Division's attack on the Nan Shan position.

In the dark the 1st Artillery Brigade (minus the 13th Artillery Regiment) and the 1st and 3rd Division guns took post on the lower slopes of Mt. Sampson, whilst the 13th Artillery Regiment and the 4th Division guns took post on high ground west of the railway.

As to the Russians, they had (1) in the trenches and redoubts in Nan Shan 2,700 infantry; (2) on

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the right, near Lower Nan-kuan-ling, a detachment and a battery; (3) on the left, near Mao-yi-tzu, a detachment and three batteries.

At 5.20 a.m. the guns opened on both sides, the Russians making good practice; soon afterwards the Japanese naval guns joined in, and about 7 a.m. the Russian guns slackened fire. Meantime the 4th Division and their artillery pushed along between the sea and Chin-chou under a heavy fire, and at 8.30 a.m. Prince Fushimi, of the 1st Division, ordered an assault, supported by his guns. The rush carried the men, though with heavy loss, to within about 350 yards from the hostile trenches, but no farther.

On the Japanese left the 3rd Division had pushed gradually forward till they had crossed the railway, but they were much harassed by the fire of the Russian gunboat off the coast, and could get no farther. All along the position the barbed wire resisted the desperate efforts of the attackers, and the ammunition for the guns was running out; but so was the Russian gun-ammunition. At noon it looked like a stalemate.

After half an hour's heavy artillery fire, Oku at 3.30 p.m. ordered another assault. It failed; but, unluckily for the Russians, General Fock did not seriously reinforce his left. This was fatal All this time the 1st and 3rd Divisions were in

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great danger; but the 4th Division pressed on, and part of it waded through the sea, turning the Russian left and menacing their line of communication. At the same moment—6.45 p.m.—the 1st and 3rd Divisions succeeded in closing in. Owing to darkness there was no pursuit, and the Russians fled southwards to Port Arthur. Losses in the battle were: Japanese, over 4,000; Russians unknown, but they lost 82 guns and much *matériel.*

Tactical Comments.—The battle was won by the stubbornness of the Japanese artillery and infantry, but the Russians would have succeeded if they had seriously reinforced their left and delivered a counter-stroke; too much value has been assigned to the Japanese gunboat fire; the battle induced financiers to lend money to Japan; Stessel has been blamed for not having more men at Nan Shan, but the fact is that any defence there could only be temporary, because the Japanese, having the command of the sea, could land anywhere; Oku acted with all the decision of Alvensleben at Vionville-Mars-la-Tour, 1870; the Russians were too crowded in the trenches, their guns not concealed, and they tried no active defence; the Japanese also attacked in formations too dense—they learnt better after this; the Russian occupation of Chin-chou was an error.

From May 27–29, Oku reorganised, and on

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NAN-SHAN

6th May 1904.



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May 30 his 2nd Army, except the 4th Division, which stopped at Chin-chou, moved southwards, occupying the important harbour of Dalny and driving in the enemy. The base of the army, hitherto near Pi-tzu-wo, was transferred to Ta-lien-wan, Dalny being assigned to the 3rd Army.

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CHAPTER VII

SECOND ARMY MOVES NORTHWARDS

THE 4th Army (10th Division only) landed at Ta-ku-shan, May 19, and by the 31st the 11th Division raised Oku to 75,000 men, and by the first week in June his 2nd Army consisted of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th (not arrived till after Te-li-ssu) Divisions; whilst the 3rd Army, under Nogi, intended to besiege Port Arthur, comprised the 1st and 11th Divisions (this army was much reinforced later).

All this time the 5th Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade were holding Pu-lan-tien, and now they were joined by the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade. On the Russian side there had arrived at Liao-yang the IV. S.A.C., *i.e.* the II. and III. S. Divisions. Kuropatkin still differed from Alexeiev about Port Arthur; but the Viceroy, who had left the fortress on May 6, and the Russian Government insisted, and the General, influenced by Stessel's report of Port Arthur's weakness, and by the fall of Nan Shan, gave way, and agreed to send Stakel-

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berg southwards to relieve Port Arthur, whilst he himself would contain Kuroki. This movement could not succeed with the 1st and 4th Armies coming from the east, with Oku always able to fall back on Nan Shan, and with the Japanese controlling the sea on the west. The Russians could not deal with Kuroki at this period, as they had not sufficient numbers, and did not possess artillery or trains suitable for mountain warfare. At that time—May 27—the Russians were thus posted:

I. S.A.C. at Ta-shih-chiao.

II. S.A.C. (V. East Siberian Rifle Division, II. Brigade XXXI. Infantry Division, II. Brigade XXXV. Infantry Division) at Liao-yang.

IV. S.A.C. (II. and III. Siberian Infantry Divisions) at Liao-yang.

Siberian Cossack Division, south of Liao-yang.

Eastern Detachment (III. and VI. East Siberian Rifle Divisions) at Lien-shan-kuan.

Rennenkampf's Cossacks at Sai-ma-chi.

Mishchenko's Cossacks at Hsiu-yen, with infantry reserve at Fen-shui-ling Pass (south-east of Hai-cheng).

Madritov's Detachment in Korea.

For the purpose above stated, Kuropatkin assigned to Stakelberg the Southern Detachment of 35,000 men and 94 guns, mainly composed of the I. S.A.C.; and on May 30 the leading cavalry

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of Stakelberg and of Oku were approaching Te-li-ssu (Wa-fang-kou or Tokuriji), and brought on the first combat of Te-li-ssu or Wu-chia-tun, in which there was a good deal of dismounted fighting, and also the only instance throughout the war of cavalry shock action, the Cossacks using lances with great effect. In the end the Russians were pushed over the Fu-chou Ho into Te-li-ssu.

May 30. First combat of Te-li-ssu.

A good deal of reconnaissance work then went on, and the Japanese cavalry commander, reporting that infantry of the I. S.A.C. had reached Te-li-ssu, was recalled to Oku's main body near Pu-lan-tien, where stood the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions, 1st Cavalry Brigade, and 1st Artillery Brigade, and a Naval Contingent of 1,500 men—total at least 45,000. Kuropatkin underrated Oku's strength, and directed Stakelberg not to fight a decisive action against superior numbers—in fact, he disliked the whole operation.

At this period (June 6–8) the positions of the combatants were:

1. Opposite Oku's 45,000 men was Stakelberg, with 3,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry, and 100 guns (mostly of the I. S.A.C.) at Te-li-ssu and northwards.
2. Opposite Kuroki's 45,000 men were Generals Keller (Eastern Detachment) and Rennenkampf, with 3,600 cavalry, 23,000 infantry, and 90 guns.

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3. Opposite the 4th Army (10th Division of 15,000 men) was Mishchenko, with 3,000 Cossacks, and some infantry supports in rear.
4. At Liao-yang was Kuropatkin, with 6,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 120 guns.
5. Madritov's small cavalry detachment at Huai-jen-hsien.
6. Ussuri forces at Vladivostok; garrison at Port Arthur.
7. Japanese 11th and 1st Divisions facing Port Arthur; 6th Division in transports.
8. Togo off Port Arthur, and smaller vessels off the west coast; Kamamura off Vladivostok.

For their concentric movement on Liao-yang the Japanese had three roads: (1) from Port Arthur for the 2nd Army; (2) *viâ* the Fen-shui-ling Pass for the 4th Army; (3) *viâ* the Mo-tien-ling Pass for the 1st Army; and, aware of Stakelberg's southward move, they took the following measures to distract the enemy: (1) the 4th Army and a Guard Brigade from Kuroki occupied Hsiu-yen; (2) the 6th Fighting Squadron bombarded off Kai-ping; (3) Kuroki demonstrated from Feng-huang-cheng.

After the Japanese cavalry retired, Stakelberg's advanced troops recrossed the Fu-chou Ho southwards. Oku's information gained by reconnaissances was fairly accurate, whereas Kuropatkin

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and Stakelberg still underrated Oku's strength; and from this cause, or because of the three above distracting movements, Kuropatkin did not adequately reinforce Stakelberg.

On June 12 Oku's supply trains arrived, and on the 13th he moved northwards in three columns—on the right the 3rd Division, in the centre the 5th Division, on the left the 4th Division—driving back some Russian outposts towards Te-li-ssu, and the left wing (the 4th Division) bending north-west towards Fu-chou. On the Russian side Stakelberg adopted a defensive attitude south of Te-li-ssu in the following positions on June 14: (1) On the right or west of the railway and north of the Fu-chou Ho (then quite fordable), General Kondratovich with a weak brigade and two batteries, and General Simonov with a strong cavalry force; (2) on the left or east of the railway and south of the Fu-chou Ho, General Gerngross, with a division and four batteries; (3) reserve, under General Glasko, at Te-li-ssu. Total, 27,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, 96 guns. These troops consisted of Stakelberg's I. S.A.C. (I. East Siberian Rifle Division under Gerngross, and IX. East Siberian Rifle Division under Kondratovich); Siberian Cossack Division; part of the XXXV. Infantry Division of the XVII. Army Corps.

On the other hand the Japanese had the 3rd Division, two regiments of the 1st Artillery

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Brigade, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade east of the railway, where touch might be gained with the 4th Army, and the 5th (having only 36 mountain-guns) and 4th Divisions, and one regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade west of the railway. Total, 37,000 men, with 216 guns.

BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU, JUNE 14–15

June 14.—The 3rd Division moving against Gerngross, and the 5th Division against Kondratovich, a severe artillery duel ensued, whilst the 1st Cavalry Brigade marched on the extreme right of the 3rd Division, and on the left the 4th Division reached the south bank of the Fu-chou Ho, south of Fu-chou. On the Russian side Stakelberg despatched the reserve under Glasko from Te-li-ssu to the aid of Gerngross, for the Russian General erroneously supposed that the real danger lay on his left, and he contemplated making there a counter-stroke. His only reserve now would be the troops detraining during the night.

June 15. — Stakelberg's entrenched position, without overhead cover, with visible entrenchments and little wire entanglement, and with a defile in the rear, extended about 8½ miles; and it is to be noted that the Russian guns hardly tried any indirect fire. Oku's idea was to attack the Russian centre, whilst turning their right with

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the 4th Division, and their left with the Cavalry Brigade.

Under cover of a mist the 3rd and 5th Divisions stole forward in the early morning, and soon afterwards the artillery on both sides opened; whilst, as for the Russian counter-stroke by the reinforced left, no definite time had been fixed for it, and so confusion resulted in the minds of Gerngross and Glasko. At last about 7 a.m. Gerngross began to move; but, just as he did so, an order arrived from Stakelberg that, if the Japanese advanced with superior force, the whole Russian corps was slowly to retire north of Te-li-ssu, and that, if the Japanese retired, there was to be no pursuit. This was the result of Kuropatkin's instructions (p. 62). Hence arose further doubts on the Russian left. Gerngross, however, did then deliver a vigorous assault on the 3rd Division. Meantime the 5th Division, west of the railway, realising the danger of the 3rd Division, east of the railway, pushed across the Fu-chou Ho and seriously attacked Simonov and Kondratovich; the 5th Division was accompanied by its own guns and by two-thirds of the 1st Artillery Brigade, one-third being with the 4th Division.

Soon afterwards the Russians, whose cavalry had not properly reconnoitred, received from the west a blow which surprised them—troops of the 4th Division fell on their right flank—

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and, though Stakelberg sent reinforcements, the Russians gave way, and at 11.30 a.m. Stakelberg ordered retirement. All this time, east of the railway the 3rd Division was in peril from the fierce counter-attack of General Gerngross; but that officer, alarmed by the sight of Japanese success west of the railway, and fired upon by the victorious 5th Division, and feeling the advance of the Japanese dismounted 1st Cavalry Brigade on his eastern flank, issued at noon (or at 1.30 p.m.) on his own initiative an order to retire. Glasko, owing to contradictory instructions, had not properly supported him, and Stakelberg's order for retreat did not reach him till the evening.

The Russians in this quarter then withdrew northwards, hotly pressed by the 3rd Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The retreat here was well managed (German Official Account disagrees), as also on the west of the railway, pressed here by the 4th Division, which in vain tried to cut the railway line. The railway defile did not favour retreat, but just north of Te-li-ssu the Japanese ceased to pursue, because they were exhausted, ammunition ran short, the ground did not suit cavalry, and it rained furiously. Oku then bivouacked near Te-li-ssu, and Stakelberg fell back on Wan-chia-ling. Losses, Japanese, 1,200; Russian, 3,600 and 13 quick-firing guns.

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Tactical Comments.—The Russians had set up no telegraphs or telephones; the railway was of tactical use, for it carried off the wounded and brought up reinforcements. Russian cavalry did not locate the Japanese 4th Division; note that the Russians were astride a river, their men were too crowded in the trenches, their guns not concealed, and the formation of their counter-attack was vicious; their reserve should at least in part have been on their right; their best plan would have been to hold Te-li-ssu with a small force and move with the rest *viâ* Fu-chou against Oku's left. Some consider the turning movement of the 4th Division an error, but it succeeded.

The result of this battle was that Port Arthur was not relieved, and that Kuropatkin during the rest of this month abandoned all offensive action, shifted troops about aimlessly, and merely desired to delay the Japanese advance—he was waiting for more troops.

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CHAPTER VIII

TA-SHIH-CHIAO

OKU then halted four days, being reinforced by the 6th Division; on June 17, however, he despatched his cavalry to Wan-chia-ling, whence the I. S.A.C. had just retired on Kai-ping. This retreat was partly caused by a demonstration of the 4th Army from the east, and on June 20 Stakelberg was concentrated at Kai-ping, whilst Oku was checked by want of ammunition, by heavy rain, and by supply difficulties, for he had to depend on Chinese carts from Pu-lan-tien, as he had no engines for the railway, though it was essential for the Japanese plan that he should move. On June 20 Oku, however, did move northwards to Hsiung-yao, and on the 23rd a Russian naval sortie from Port Arthur, with the fleet repaired, and, in fact, stronger than Togo's, rendered the issue of the campaign doubtful, when, for some unknown reason, the Russian fleet returned to harbour.[1]

A few days afterwards Oku sent a detachment north-eastwards to connect with the 4th Army,

[1] Admiral Vitgeft should have accepted battle; he had not the moral courage.

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and eased the supply problem by arranging that men should push along the railway captured Russian waggons, and that goods should be carted from Ta-lien-wan to Chin-chou Bay and there put on junks for carriage up the coast.

In consequence on July 6 (on which day the Commander-in-Chief, Oyama, and the Chief of Staff, Kodama, left Tokio for the front) the 2nd Army began to move towards Kai-ping—on the right the 5th Division (because its mountain-guns suited that hilly district), in the centre the 3rd and 6th Divisions, on the left the 4th—repulsing some Russian troops.

REARGUARD ACTION AT KAI-PING, JULY 9

Stakelberg occupied the Kai-ping position, with a sweep of level ground in front of him. This dangerous zone the Japanese crossed on the night July 8–9, and at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th their guns opened; but the Russian General was bent on retiring, which he did with skill, merely fighting a rearguard action.

From July 10–22 the 2nd Army stopped at Kai-ping, supply being much improved and news coming in of the Russian repulse by Kuroki at the Mo-tien-ling Pass on the 17th, and of the occupation of Ta-shih-chiao by Stakelberg. This place was the junction for Ying-kou, and, as the latter place would facilitate Oku's supply, the Russians would be sure to resist. On July 23

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Oku moved—on the right the 5th Division, in the centre the 3rd and 6th Divisions, on the left the 4th Division, and on the extreme left the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The march lay over a plain covered with kao-liang six feet high, and brought the Japanese that night a few miles south of Ta-shih-chiao, the I. S.A.C. and half the IV. S.A.C. not seriously opposing.

The Russians, under General Zarubaiev, held, south of Ta-shih-chiao, a 10-mile (German Official Account states 7½ miles) front, with redoubts, trenches, wire entanglement, abattis, mines, and carefully concealed gun-positions.

BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO, JULY 24

Russian Position.—Left wing, under General Shileiko, in trenches north of Tai-ping Ling; Centre, under General Oganovski, all of the IV. S.A.C.; Right wing, consisting of Stakelberg's I. S.A.C., near Yung-an-tun; Reserve at Huang-ta-ssu. On the extreme right flank was the Siberian Cossack Division of Kossakovski, west of the railway, and on the extreme left were Mishchenko's Cossacks. The guns totalled 112. The Japanese numbered close on 60,000, with 252 guns.

Oku's orders for attack at 4 a.m. were: On the right the 5th Division on Tai-ping Ling; in the centre the 3rd and 6th Divisions, under cover of fire from two-thirds of the 1st Artillery Brigade;

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on the left the 4th Division and one-third of the 1st Artillery Brigade were held back for the present. On the extreme left along the railway the 1st Cavalry Brigade acted. The General Reserve was placed in rear of the centre.

In the quarter occupied by the I. S.A.C. at 5.30 a.m. the guns opened, the Russians using indirect fire, and a long and severe artillery duel ensued; whilst the Japanese 6th Division made hardly any progress. On the left of the 6th Division and east of the railway the 4th Division and one-third of the 1st Artillery Brigade moved abreast of the 6th Division, though checked a good deal by the Cossacks of General Kossakovski. All this time the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade along the railway remained passive.

In the quarter occupied by the IV. S.A.C. at 7.30 a.m. the 5th and 3rd Divisions advanced under a heavy gun-fire; the 3rd Division pressed the Russian centre under Oganovski so hard that the Russian left under Shileiko had to send guns in support. In fact 56 guns (32 being quick-firing) stopped the two Japanese divisions which had 72 inferior guns. The two divisions at 3.30 p.m. advanced, but the gun-fire and the rifle-fire from the trenches were too much for them, in spite of the desperate efforts of the 3rd Division in particular. At sunset the Russians still held firm; the frontal attack had failed because, though the Japanese had far more guns, their

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guns were not equal to the Russians', and the latter carefully concealed their batteries. But the heroism of the defenders was thrown away by the incapable Zarubaiev's decision to retire.

The commander of the Japanese 5th Division gained Oku's permission to deliver a night-attack, and so at 10 p.m. that division stole forward and carried the Tai-ping Ling position; and on the morning of July 25 the three other divisions advanced, opposed only by a Russian rearguard.

The fact was that Zarubaiev had retired at midnight, because he feared the 4th Army from the east. He burnt his stores, and there was no pursuit, and on July 27 the I. and IV. S.A. Corps reached Hai-cheng. Losses: Japanese, 1,000; Russian, 2,000 (German Official Account, 600). Note that defenders lost more, and that artillery preparation must precede infantry attacks.

From July 25–31 the 2nd Army, now joined by Marshal Oyama and General Kodama, halted at Ta-shih-chiao, its cavalry in touch with the 4th Army on the right. Oku occupied Ying-kou, which facilitated the supply and gave a railway, but both the main and branch lines had for some time to be worked by man-power. He also despatched the 5th Division eastwards to join the 4th Army, which it helped on July 31 at Hsi-mu-cheng, taking the place of Kuroki's Guard Brigade, which, returning to that general, helped him on July 30–31 at Yu-shu-ling and Yang-tzu-ling.

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On August 1 Oku moved northwards on Hai-cheng, which he occupied August 3, the Russian I. and IV. S.A. Corps having abandoned their works there and fallen back on An-shan-chan. On the same date the 4th Army reached Hai-cheng, and the front of the three Japanese armies now extended 45 instead of 140 miles.

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

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CHAPTER IX

THE JAPANESE FOURTH ARMY

THIS army landed at Ta-ku-shan from May 19 to June 9, and consisted of the 10th Division under General Kawamura, as a link between the 1st and 2nd Armies, and its base remained at Ta-ku-shan until October, 1904. All care was taken to deceive the Russians, and the landing was easily effected, and telegraphic communication established with the 1st and 2nd Armies.

On the Russian side, previous to May 1, General Mishchenko had 1,100 Cossacks, 2,400 infantry, 8 field and 6 horse-artillery guns watching the district from the mouth of the Ya-lu to Pi-tzu-wo, but in consequence of the defeat on the Ya-lu (May 1) he had retired towards Tang-shan-cheng. Kuropatkin, however, stayed this retirement, and instructed the cavalry general to hold the road from Ta-ku-shan *viâ* Hsiu-yen against any Japanese that might land, and, to help him in this, some infantry were moved to Fen-shui-ling Pass.

Hearing of Stakelberg's move southwards against the 2nd Army, Japanese Imperial Head-

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quarters on June 2 instructed Kawamura to move on Kai-ping. With this object the 4th Army must occupy Hsiu-yen, and to help it Kuroki detached a Guard brigade. Kawamura now prepared to advance north-westwards from Ta-ku-shan on Hsiu-yen, whilst from Feng-huang-cheng the Guard Brigade converged on the same place from the east. Mishchenko's report of this caused Kuropatkin to place an infantry brigade at Hsi-mu-cheng. Kawamura and the Guard Brigade managed to connect, and against these superior forces Mishchenko had only 6 guns and 1,600 Cossacks south and east of Hsiu-yen.

BATTLE OF HSIU-YEN, JUNE 8

Kawamura's advanced troops came up from the south and the Guard Brigade from the east; the latter divided into (1) cavalry and right column, to cut the Russian retreat; (2) central column; (3) left column, to strike the Russian left flank, in concert with Kawamura's advance. All this time the Russian horse-artillery battery west of Hsiu-yen did good work, the Japanese Guard Brigade being unable to bring up their field-guns, and Kawamura's force having only mountain-guns. Part of the Guard right column, however, debouched on the road north of Hsiu-yen that leads to Hai-cheng, and this, at 4 p.m., caused Mishchenko to order retirement. At once the Japanese

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advanced, and the Cossacks fled unpursued along the Hai-cheng road.

All Kawamura's 10th Division and the Guard Brigade then halted at Hsiu-yen, which halt allowed of improving the defective transport. Oku's transport having been arranged so that he could move on June 13, Japanese Imperial Headquarters on that date directed Kawamura to advance. He decided at first to make for Kai-ping; but Oku's victory at Te-li-ssu (June 15) made it unnecessary for the 4th Army to march to his aid, and that army was now therefore to act as a link between the 1st and 2nd Armies, which meant that Kawamura must aim at Fen-shui-ling Pass.

In front lay Mishchenko, to the west of the pass, and General Levestam at the pass itself, both entrenched. Kawamura, on June 24, issued orders for an action on June 27: Right wing, Guard troops, to move straight on Fen-shui-ling Pass, and also to turn the Russian left; centre, Colonel Kamada's Detachment, to move against the Russian right; left wing, General Marui's Detachment, to sweep round the Russian right on to their line of retreat; extreme left wing, General Tojo's Detachment, to cover the exposed flank of the left wing; General Reserve in rear of the Guards. All these movements were carefully synchronised.[1]

The Russian numbers are not known; but

[1] Kawamura probably had 17,000 men, the Russians, 12,000.

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the British Official Account states 14 infantry battalions (including I. Brigade II. Siberian Infantry Division from Hsi-mu-cheng and infantry stated as being already at Fen-shui-ling), 24 squadrons, 4 field batteries, and 1 horse-artillery battery (German Official Account differs).[1]

Just as his men were moving, Kawamura heard from Tokio that, the Russian fleet being still able to issue from Port Arthur, sea-transport was not safe, and that in consequence the expected battle of Liao-yang would have to be postponed; nevertheless, the General adhered to his plan of attack.

FEN-SHUI-LING OR DA-LING CARRIED, JUNE 26–27

The Japanese movements were executed as arranged without much resistance, except on the extreme left, and on June 27 the Guard troops and Kamada's Detachment moved on Fen-shui-ling, considerable artillery fire being developed on both sides; but ultimately the Russian defenders fell back towards Hsi-mu-cheng, the turning force of the Guard troops not being able to cut off their retreat.

Meantime Marui's column had swept round on the south-west, and had a good chance of cutting off the Russian retreat, when a violent sand-storm stopped all operations. As to Tojo's column, the resistance he met was so obstinate that he could make no headway. Still the Fen-shui-ling had been carried; but as the Russian

[1] Kawamura probably had 17,000 men, the Russians, 12,000.

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naval sortie of June 23 had checked the 2nd Army Kawamura for the present halted and did not pursue the enemy.

This delay caused by the Russian naval sortie of June 23, by supply difficulties and by the urgent need of risking nothing for fear of alarming financiers who were being asked for loans, enabled the Russians to organise the defence at Hsi-mu-cheng whither the infantry and field-guns from Fen-shui-ling retired, whilst Mishchenko's cavalry went westwards to Tang-chih.

On July 5 Kawamura heard that Oku was about to start for Kai-ping and also estimated that the Russians at Hsi-mu-cheng numbered 25,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 60 guns. The fact was that Kuropatkin had for some time been pushing men into the front line, and thus a very considerable force (composed indeed of different units) faced the Japanese 10th Division by the middle of July. It was therefore necessary to strengthen the 10th Division, and so, on July 16, the 10th Kobi Brigade was added to it, and of this 4th Army General Nodzu took command, whilst the Guard Brigade moved off eastwards to rejoin Kuroki. To take the pressure off the 2nd Army Nodzu, on July 24, marched north-westwards on Hsi-mu-cheng, and on the march the 4th Army had the 5th Division added to it. After Ta-shih-chiao (July 24) the Russians had retired to Hai-cheng, leaving only one infantry brigade

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with some guns at Hsi-mu-cheng, strongly entrenched and assisted by Mishchenko's Cossacks (German Official Account puts Zasulich in command and gives the Russian numbers as much larger, calling them the II. Siberian Army Corps).[1]

ACTION OF HSI-MU-CHENG, JULY 30–31

Nodzu's plan was to attack in front with the 10th Division and the 10th Kobi Brigade, and to outflank from the west with the 5th Division, telegraphic communication between the two divisions being established.

On July 30 the Japanese troops pushed forward as planned without much opposition, and on July 31 all the 10th Division and the 10th Kobi Brigade moved west of Hsi-mu-cheng against desperate resistance, whilst the 5th Division fought its way in from the west, helped on its left by a detachment under General Kodama from the 3rd Division (sent by General Oku). Still the Russians fiercely resisted throughout the day, delivering several counter-attacks, and the result was by no means clear when the Russians, by Kuropatkin's orders, retired under cover of darkness towards Hai-cheng, losing 6 guns and 1,500 men. The result was that the 2nd and 4th Armies gained contact.

[1] G.O.A. probably correct.

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CHAPTER X

THE JAPANESE FIRST ARMY

ALL the time from May 6 to June 23 the 1st Army lay round Feng-huang-cheng, ready to take part in the concentric move on Liao-yang. Blocking its way at Lien-shan-kuan stood Zasulich's Eastern Detachment, flanked on the left by Rennenkampf near Sai-ma-chi and on the right by Mishchenko near Hsiu-yen.

On May 7 Rennenkampf reached Sai-ma-chi, and at once reconnoitred eastwards, gaining, however, very little information. On May 17 Count Keller superseded Zasulich, who returned to his command of the II. S.A.C. at Hai-cheng. Rennenkampf kept on scouting, but learnt nothing, and was so imposed upon by Chinese reports that he hurried northwards to Cheng-chang in order to block the road to Mukden. These reports led the Russians to think a large Japanese force was moving on Sai-ma-chi, and in consequence the II. Brigade II. Siberian Infantry Division was sent to Keller, and thus Stakelberg's relieving force was much weakened. The result was that Count

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Keller had early in June, near Lien-shan-kuan, the III. East Siberian Rifle Division, VI. East Siberian Rifle Division, II. Brigade II. Siberian Infantry Division, and 34 guns. Supply difficulties and the necessity of waiting for the two other armies detained Kuroki at Feng-huang-cheng from May 6 to June 23, but early in June he demonstrated against Keller in order to cause Kuropatkin to weaken Stakelberg.

On June 24 all was ready, and Kuroki moved—Guards on the left, 2nd Division in the centre, 12th Division on the right—northwards, handing over Feng-huang-cheng to Kobi troops. The roads were terrible, but the enemy did not offer much resistance, and indeed on June 30 the Japanese occupied Mo-tien-ling, which Keller abandoned because it was not a strong defensive position and because he had been weakened by Kuropatkin recalling several of his battalions and issuing the most contradictory orders—*e.g.* the XII. East Siberian Rifle Regiment was pushed about from place to place in the most extraordinary manner (compare the French 6th Corps in August, 1870).

The real obstacles to Kuroki's forward march were the fear of some drastic action by Kuropatkin and the torrents of rain from June 27 to July 5.[1] During this period, on July 4, Keller carried out his first reconnaissance in force (generally an unwise operation) by attacking the

Keller's first reconnaissance.

[1] Another obstacle "to Kuroki's forward march" was the Russian naval sortie of June 23.

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Mo-tien-ling; it was a badly arranged night-attack, and was repulsed by the 2nd Division. As the X. Army Corps now began to arrive at Liao-yang from Europe, part of it was sent to reinforce Keller and part to reinforce Rennenkampf.

Keller's second reconnaissance.

On July 17 Keller carried out his second reconnaissance in force (battle of the Heaven-reaching Pass) by again attacking the Mo-tien-ling against the 2nd Division, whose main body held Lien-shan-kuan, with detachments in front holding all the passes. It was a night-attack, for which, however, the Japanese were prepared, and opened with a feint against the Japanese left on the Hsin-kai-ling; but the main effort was against the Japanese centre at Mo-tien-ling, where was the 30th Regiment with six guns, which latter did good service. Both sides were reinforced, and severe fighting followed, the Russians firing in volleys, the Japanese individually.[1] Finally the attackers retired northwards on Ta-wan. Meantime, on the Japanese right, at Hsia-ma-tang, the Russians had delivered a sharp onslaught, which the 16th Regiment repulsed with the help of troops from the main body. There was no pursuit. This attack cost the Russians 1,000 men, but should have revealed to them the position of the Japanese 2nd Division.

On Kuroki's right the 12th Division, checked by the state of the roads, did not till July 18 approach Chiao-tou or Sihoyen, a strategic point,

[1] July 17, Keller had no guns.

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because through it lay a route to Liao-yang and Mukden. This place had been garrisoned by Rennenkampf when, at the end of June, he had retired from Cheng-chang to Hsiao-hsi-erh, where he being wounded was superseded by General Liubavin; there was also a Russian force at Pen-hsi-hu. The Japanese 12th Division discovered the Russian troops at Chiao-tou drawn up west of the place. Their left and centre were entrenched, but the millet was high enough to conceal the Japanese approach. On the 18th the plan of attack was formed—a frontal assault and a turning movement (helped by a detachment from the 2nd Division) round the enemy's right.

ACTION OF CHIAO-TOU,[1] JULY 19

After an hour's duel between the Russian and Japanese guns, the latter well concealed, the frontal assault developed, the men working their way forward in extended order; meantime the flanking party swung round the Russian right and joined the 2nd Division detachment. Their line of retreat being thus threatened, the Russians retired towards Yu-shu-ling, suffering heavily from an attack delivered from the south by the Japanese flanking party. Note that the Russians made little use of their reserve, and no use of their Cossacks or of their field-guns to delay pursuit.

[1] Chiao-tou sometimes called Sihoyen.

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

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Kuroki was at last ready to move on Liao-yang, but on the other side there arrived at Liao-yang troops of General Bilderling's XVII. Army Corps; and Kuropatkin at once decided in person to strike Kuroki with the X. Corps (24,000 men), which concentrated, together with its own troops from Chiao-tou, on July 24 on the Lan Ho, north-west of Yu-shu-ling, in front of Kuroki, whilst, at Pen-hsi-hu, threatening Kuroki's right were the troops already there plus Liubavin's Cossacks from Hsiao-hsi-erh. The Russian General's plan was meantime to contain Oku and Nodzu (compare Benedek, June 26–28, 1866. You can contain an enemy by (1) sending cavalry against his communications, a course which in this case the millet prevented; (2) entrenchments; (3) and rearguard actions—both of which Kuropatkin employed, entrenchments being formed at Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and An-shan-chan).[1]

Kuropatkin now wasted four days, and did nothing till July 29. On that date he returned to Liao-yang, leaving General Sluchevski of the X. Corps in command; this officer that evening issued orders for battle at Yu-shu-ling, directing his right to connect with Keller's Eastern Detachment and his left (General Grekov's Detachment) to connect with Liubavin at Pen-hsi-hu.

The four days' delay had given Kuroki time, and he upset Kuropatkin's plan, and met the

[1] See note, No. 4, p. 108.

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danger to his 12th Division, not by reinforcing it, but by taking the offensive all along the line, having called up his detached Guard Brigade (it arrived July 28) from the 4th Army and several Kobi troops from his rear.[1]

BATTLES OF YANG-TZU-LING AND YU-SHU-LING, JULY 31

(1) At Yang-tzu-ling Kuroki's Guard and 2nd Division opposed Count Keller's Eastern Detachment (III. and VI. East Siberian Rifle Divisions); (2) at Yu-shu-ling Kuroki's 12th Division opposed Sluchevski's X. Corps and Liubavin.

In No. (1) "Count Keller held a semicircle, of which the centre was the Yang-tzu-ling" (B.O.A.), behind the shallow Lan Ho, with 28 field and 4 mountain guns, which were skilfully placed. The chief defects were that the villages in the Lan Ho valley were not prepared for defence, that the millet was not cut down, and that counter-attack was hardly possible.

In No. (2), which was 12 miles north of No. (1), the 12th Division from Chiao-tou entrenched itself in the plain. Kuroki's plan of attack is thus summarised in the B.O.A.: (1) To turn Keller's right with the Guards; (2) to contain Keller at Ta-wan with the 2nd Division; (3) to move parts of the 2nd Division (a daring manœuvre; compare Jackson's march at Chan-

[1] Kuroki totalled 37,000, Keller 17,000, Sluchevski 22,000, Liubavin 6,000.

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cellorsville, 1863) and the 12th Division against Sluchevski at Pien-ling; (4) to crush Sluchevski's left at the Yu-shu-ling with the rest of the 12th Division.

At Yang-tzu-ling the Guards, moving down the Lan Ho, found their artillery outclassed, and the Russians, using excellent individual fire, stopped them (Asada, the Guard commander, had a fit of hesitation like Ney at Bautzen, 1813, or the II. Bavarian Corps at Wörth, 1870); and practically their only real success was gained by their right wing, which, supported by 18 guns, carried Yang-mu-lin-tzu by a frontal attack. This success was really due to the 2nd Division. This division confined itself to gun-fire till it heard of the Guards' failure, whereupon it assailed Count Keller north of Ta-wan; but this division also failed to gain much ground.

Unfortunately for the Russians, who were not half-beaten, their daring commander, Keller, had been killed, and his successor, Kashtalinski, decided to retire, though he had still intact the III. East Siberian Rifle Division; he probably acted as he did because Keller had fallen, and the X. Corps had been worsted at Yu-shu-ling.

At Yu-shu-ling the Russian right-flank detachment (not entrenched), under General Martson, was at the Pien-ling (W.), and their main body on the Shih Shan and the Fu-chia Shan heights.

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Against the above right-flank detachment at the Pien-ling (W.), moved from near Chiao-tou, in the west, part of the 12th Division, and from Hsia-ma-tang, in the south, part of the 2nd Division, which thus caught Martson on his right flank, and the Russian had to flee back to the Lan Ho.

Next, I must describe the Japanese attack on the Russian main position on the Shih Shan and the Fu-chia Shan. In this quarter the cavalry, and some Kobi troops on the right, watched Liubavin at Pen-hsi-hu; the rest of the Japanese moved partly south of the Hsi Ho against Shih Shan, but could do little, because the 12th Division troops, under Sasaki (commanding 12th Brigade), victorious at Pien-ling (W.), could not pierce the intricate country to their assistance; partly north of the Hsi Ho against Fu-chia Shan, where the Russians, assailed at dawn, were surprised, and where the Japanese guns near Chin-chia-pu-tzu assisted, whilst the Russian gun-fire from Shih Shan proved ineffective. From 12 noon to 3 p.m. the great heat stopped all action. During the rest of the day both sides confined themselves to firing, and at the end of it Sluchevski, who was not half-beaten, fell back to Tun-chia-pu, behind the Lan Ho, because his right-flank detachment had been beaten, because Liubavin had done nothing, and because Kashtalinski had retired. Thus the 1st Army could move

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farther on Liao-yang. Losses: Russian, 2,400; Japanese, 1,000; attackers losing fewer. Note that the Lan Ho separated the Russian forces, and that their command was divided amongst three officers. The Russians had more cavalry and artillery and nearly as many infantry, but the cavalry did not reconnoitre, the artillery did not push to the front, the reserves were not boldly used; whereas the Japanese acted with audacity—*e.g.* the 12th Division was all used up.

Kuroki did not pursue, and by August 2 the X. Army Corps was on the front Anping-ling—Kung-chang-ling, in touch with the Eastern Detachment near Lang-tzu-shan, and for three weeks remained facing the 1st Army. At this time the Eastern Detachment was renamed the III. Siberian Army Corps under General Ivanov, and, with the X. and XVII. Corps, was placed under General Bilderling and styled the Eastern Front.

Naval sorties.

On August 10 the Russian Port Arthur fleet failed in a sortie, and on August 14 the Russian Vladivostok squadron likewise failed. These were the last efforts of these fleets.

The general result of the campaign was that the Russians stood from August 2 to 22 east, south, and south-west of Liao-yang in two masses: (1) the Eastern Front, under Bilderling, from Hsiao-hsi-kou to the northern bank of the Tai-tzu Ho—III.

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S.A.C., X. A.C., and XVII. A.C.; (2) the Southern Front, under Zarubaiev, at An-shan-chan—I., II., and IV. S. A. Corps. The link between the two was formed by Mishchenko till August 19, when he retired to Liao-yang, and his place was taken by two mixed detachments. General Liubavin and Colonel Grulev were still at Pen-hsi-hu, and more to the east, near Ching-ho-cheng, Madritov's Detachment, whilst on the west, in the Liao Ho valley, stood Kossakovski's Detachment—Madritov and Kossakovski took no part in the Liao-yang fighting; in Port Arthur were the IV. and VII. East Siberian Rifle Divisions, with the Russian fleet; and finally, at Mukden, was the V. S.A.C. The total of the effectives near Liao-yang ran up to 140,000, with 474 field-guns, 50 horse or mountain guns, 6 field-mortars, and 16 machine-guns. These numbers were increased during the Liao-yang fighting.

In front stood the Japanese, likewise in two masses, separated by 30 miles—on the right, on the Lan Ho, Kuroki's 1st Army (46,000), with Guard Kobi troops on his right-rear protecting the communications against Liubavin and Madritov; on the left Oku's 2nd Army (48,000), including the 11th Kobi Brigade, and Nodzu's 4th Army (31,000), including the 10th Kobi Brigade, near Hai-cheng; total of Japanese ran up to 125,000, of whom 110,000 were infantry, and these numbers were not increased during the Liao-yang

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fighting. Round Port Arthur were Togo's fleet and Nogi's 3rd Army.

In detail Kuropatkin had the XVII. A.C. under Bilderling, X. A.C. under Sluchevski, IV. S.A.C. under Zarubaiev, III. S.A.C. under Ivanov, II. S.A.C. under Zasulich, I. S.A.C. under Stakelberg, and Independent Cavalry—Cossacks of Grekov, Mishchenko, Samsonov, Rennenkampf, and the Caucasian Cavalry of Prince Orbeliani. On the other side, Oyama had the 2nd Army, consisting of the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, 11th Kobi Brigade, 1st Cavalry Brigade, and 1st Field Artillery Brigade (three Artillery regiments), with some mortars and howitzers; the 4th Army, consisting of the 5th and 10th Divisions, and 10th Kobi Brigade; and the 1st Army, consisting of the 12th, 2nd, and Guard Divisions, and Guard Kobi Brigade.

During this period, August 2 to 22, communications were improved, dépôts established at Chiao-tou, etc., the 2nd Army's base shifted to Ying-kou, but the 4th Army's base remained at Ta-ku-shan. The Japanese plan was to move concentrically on Liao-yang on August 18, but they delayed, because it rained heavily and because they hoped the 3rd Army would capture Port Arthur and march to assist in the battle. They were well informed about the Russians, whereas the latter overestimated Kuroki, supposing him to have the 9th Division (really at Port Arthur), and Nodzu,

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supposing him to have the 8th Division (really in Japan), and consequently Kuropatkin planned to hold Liao-yang on the defensive; but about August 23, after the arrival of all the XVII. Army Corps and the V. Siberian Army Corps, he took a view much more in favour of the offensive. The I. A.C. was just arriving.

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CHAPTER XI

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR

THIS place was fairly strong, and defended, though hastily, by all means known to science, with plenty of food and ammunition. Stessel and the commander of the VII. E.S.R. Division, Kondratenko, the hero of the siege, had 47,000 men, consisting of the IV. and VII. E.S.R. Divisions, and V. Regiment II. E.S.R. Division, as well as artillery, sailors, and the Russian naval squadron. The guns numbered about 540.

The besiegers (65,000) consisted of Nogi's 3rd Army, comprising the 1st Division, 11th Division, some Kobi troops, the 9th Division in July, the 2nd F.A. Brigade, Siege Park, and naval brigade helped by Togo's fleet.

The investment really began on May 26, and is divided into three periods: (1) May 26 to June 26, simple investment; on June 6 Oku had left Nogi with the 1st and 11th Divisions to deal with the fortress. At this time the Russians held the Position of the Passes, *i.e.* a line from Shuang-tai-

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kou to Lao-tso Shan (Green Hills). Nogi stood opposite from An-tzu Shan to Ta-tzu Shan, with the 1st Division on his right and the 11th Division on his left. He cleared the Russian mines from Ta-lien Bay and organised Dalny as a base, whilst Stessel also kept on strengthening his position.

(2) June 26 to July 26, distant attack. During this period Nogi advanced very slowly, whilst Admiral Alexeiev, the Viceroy, constantly, though ineffectually, pressed on Admiral Vitgeft the necessity of breaking out to Vladivostok—Vitgeft held he ought to protect Port Arthur.

(3) July 26 to January 1, 1905, proper siege; in all, 240 days. On July 26 the Japanese acted seriously against the Position of the Passes, helped by Togo's vessels, whilst Vitgeft helped the defence. Next day the assault was continued, and on July 28 the Russians felt compelled to evacuate the Position of the Passes and to fall back on Feng-huang Shan (Wolf Hills), the Japanese—1st Division on the right, 9th Division in the centre, 11th Division on the left—occupying the front Chang-ling-tzu—Lung-wang-tang. The Japanese loss was about 4,000 (their total loss in the siege was 60,000), and that of the Russians about 2,000.

The Russians now held the last line of defence outside the permanent fortifications, namely, Louisa Bay, Wolf Hills, Ta-ku Shan, Hsiao-ku Shan. This was a weak line, trenches having no overhead cover, uncut millet protecting the enemy,

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and the Japanese allowing no time, for on July 30 they came on and captured Wolf Hills. The Russians then evacuated all this position except Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, and retired into the permanent fortifications of Port Arthur, giving up all idea of offensive action.

The forts round the town itself were only half completed, and but for the existence of the old Chinese Wall, the place could never have held out. Stessel, however, and Kondratenko now worked hard at defensive arrangements, *e.g.* wire entanglements, abattis, deep pits, chevaux de frise, inundated ditches, and electric fences, which last failed to act. The defences on the whole were not of the most modern type. Unfortunately for the Russians there was a sort of dual command, Stessel and General Smirnov having conflicting authority, but Kondratenko overcame this difficulty.

Nogi decided to assail the north-eastern front, and posted his 1st Division on the right eastwards from Louisa Bay opposite the Temple Redoubts and Fort Sung-shu, the 9th Division in his centre opposite Forts Ehr-lung, West and East Pan-lung, the 11th Division on his left, opposite Ta-ku Shan, Hsiao-ku Shan, Fort Chi-kuan, and Chi-kuan Battery.

On August 7, the bloody month, the bombardment from the land side began, and by the 9th the 11th Division had carried Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan. This capture which facilitated

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bombardment, coupled with a direct order from the Tsar to break out to Vladivostok, induced Admiral Vitgeft to deliver the naval sortie of August 10, which resulted in the Battle of the Yellow Sea with Admiral Togo. The Russian admiral was killed, and the command passed to Prince Ukhtomski (as it had passed before on the death of Admiral Makarov on April 13), who ultimately led his fleet, weakened by the loss of some vessels, into Port Arthur. This result was of enormous importance to the Japanese, for an escape of the Russian fleet to Vladivostok, where the Baltic fleet could join it, would have hampered their plans.

This failure disheartened the garrison, who also knew that the Baltic fleet had not yet started; it likewise encouraged Nogi, who, in order to capture the Russian ships and to be able to reinforce Oyama at Liao-yang, decided on a general assault, though his siege guns were weak. Therefore from August 13 to 24 the 1st Division in the west advanced and captured several outlying posts, including 174 Metre Hill, whilst part of the 9th Division failed on the Water Works Redoubt; and more to the south-east the rest of the 9th Division, after desperate efforts, carried East and West Pan-lung. Finally, the 9th and 11th Divisions combined in an effort against Wang-tai, which effort failed, and the first general assault came to an end with a Russian loss of 3,000 and a Japanese loss of 15,000. It has been suggested that the

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1st Division could have done more, and that the 9th and 11th Divisions attacked on too narrow a front, but the fact remains that the Russians fought well.

Then Nogi sat down to regular operations, and brought up heavy guns which should have been there earlier, and engaged in mine-warfare, and gradually overcame the powerful and well-concealed Russian batteries. A fortress cannot hold out for long against modern guns; but the attack was not well managed—the artillery was at first not good enough and the infantry was asked to do the impossible; it was not Nogi's fault.

Meantime, in the north, after several more or less successful cruises, in which neutral vessels, carrying contraband, and Japanese vessels were captured. Admiral Kamamura could not prevent these cruises, because he dared not leave Tsu-shima Island where he could hinder any junction of the two Russian fleets. The Vladivostok squadron, under Admiral Iessen, set sail on August 12, hoping to meet Admiral Vitgeft. As a fact he met Admiral Kamamura in the Battle of Ulsan, close to Fusan, where he was beaten, and thence returned to Vladivostok.

Comments.—Should the Japanese have masked or besieged Port Arthur? From a military point of view no doubt the correct thing was to mask, because that course would have enabled a larger

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force to move against Kuropatkin; but Port Arthur was not a Metz, it was a naval fortress, and the justification for the siege is that it was absolutely necessary to capture the Russian fleet before the latter could be joined by the Baltic Fleet. It is also obvious that, if Port Arthur had been merely masked, Kuropatkin would have had a freer hand, and it is probable that the small numbers Oyama had at Liao-yang were due quite as much to supply difficulties as to the siege. There was also the political importance of the place. It has been suggested by Chasseur, I think, that Oku was wrong in turning on Nan Shan. He should have turned northwards, and left Nan Shan and Port Arthur to be dealt with by Nogi; thus all three Japanese armies could more rapidly have converged on Kuropatkin and attacked him while still inferior in numbers. As it was, Oku lost six weeks, and gave Kuropatkin time to get reinforcements. The only objection to this argument is that transports in which to convey Nogi's army may have been wanting, and that Stessel would have acted against Oku's communications.

Let us now look at the question from the Russian point of view. Whether fortresses are wise or not, it is clear that they can easily be overrated; they should be subordinated to the field army, and should be used to assist the offensive action of a mobile army or of a sea-going fleet. If the Russian fleet had been active and victorious, there would have been no need

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to discuss the question at all, but in the actual circumstances the Russians had two courses open —either to retain the fortress in strength, as they did, or to evacuate it early in the war.

In favour of the former course, Admiral Mahan and others have urged that it retained large numbers of the enemy, as in the case of Ladysmith. It sheltered the Russian fleet, it enabled the Vladivostok vessels to prey on Japanese commerce, it gave Russia time to hurry up the Baltic Fleet, it delayed Oku's northward march, and the place possessed great political value.

In favour of the latter course, Dragomirof advised early evacuation, because it would mean the fleet issuing and fighting a desperate battle, in which either Togo would be beaten, or at least damaged—and Togo was Russia's real foe. If this advice had been followed, then the precedent of 1812 could have been acted upon. Whether Kuropatkin included in his original plan of retreat the early evacuation of Port Arthur, I do not know, but it is obvious that, as long as Port Arthur remained occupied by a Russian garrison, no such retreating policy could have been pursued. If only Kuropatkin could beat the Japanese armies, he would inevitably recover the fortress, and its early evacuation would have facilitated a victory—*e.g.* its troops on the Ya-lu would have beaten Kuroki. As to sheltering the fleet till the Baltic Fleet should arrive, the argument fails,

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because the latter fleet could not possibly get there in time. The fortress was a fatal snare for the Russian fleet and a fatal magnet for Kuropatkin. No doubt it contained a force larger than the garrison, but, as a fact, a smaller force might have invested it.

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CHAPTER XII

GENERAL COMMENTS

TACTICAL.—We note constant usage of railways—*e.g.* the Russians retreated by railway, and frequently laid down light railways. The whole war favours the tactical offensive, pure and simple, which is against Moltke's defensive-offensive idea of tactics, although the German view can certainly be supported by the fact that modern arms favour the tactical defensive.

As to infantry, we find hand-to-hand fighting, bayonet charges, frontal attacks in dense masses, *e.g.* at Liao-yang, and night attacks. The Russian infantry held fast to the belief in the old-fashioned volley and in the bayonet. They were bad in mountain fighting, where the offensive has great advantages; they indulged too much in passive defence, never thinking of counter-attack; and held back their reserves, whereas the Japanese brought up every man. Their retreats were skilful, but had a bad moral effect. They put too much trust in entrenchments; and Shevtsov, the Russian author, comments on their defective tactical training.

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They foolishly trusted to defensive positions—the "positionist heresy" of the eighteenth century, and of Benedek in 1866—and then in counter-attacking with the bayonet, whereas the only real method to meet modern weapons is by mobility. "To march and attack by night, to shelter in earthworks by day, is the only way to meet modern firearms" (de Négrier).

The Japanese infantry displayed extraordinary endurance, but even they found barbed wire and machine-guns terrible obstacles. Their usual tactics were an enveloping attack in equal force at all points. Even on the offensive, they employed rough shelter-trenches.[1] The Japanese at first objected, as the Germans do, to night operations, but afterwards altered their opinion; and in such operations they insisted on silence, forbade firing and the use of artillery, and trusted to the bayonet and hand-grenades. It should be noted that the Japanese do not excel at signalling—they rely on the telegraph, as Continental armies of Europe do.

As to cavalry, few lessons can be learnt, because both sides misused their cavalry. The Russian horsemen were too much on foot, and, indeed, there was hardly any mounted fighting with sword or lance. But one must not ignore the pronounced opinions of the French general de Négrier, who holds that the Cossacks failed because they were bad shots and because their guns were of no

[1] See note, No. 5, p. 108.

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avail against villages and field entrenchments. They should have light mortars and howitzers, should carry rifles and bayonets, and should fight on foot, as the Japanese horsemen fought at Te-li-ssu; the so-called "cavalry spirit" must disappear.

As to artillery, the Japanese used extensive artillery preparation, concealed their guns not on the heights, but behind them; their guns were, however, on the whole, inferior to their opponent's and they had no horse artillery.[1] Gun-shields were seen to be a necessity. General de Négrier remarks, "heavy guns, mortars, and machine-guns are indispensable; artillery is the dominant factor by day, infantry can seldom act effectively except by night."

Strategic.—As to cavalry, we note very little pursuit by the Japanese, and the want of cavalry robbed them of the fruits of victory. This failure to pursue has been assigned not only to lack of horsemen, but also to fatigue and to excess of caution. We note also the total failure of the Russian cavalry to do anything; they were nearly all Cossacks, who are ill-trained and of little use, and they never could pierce the screen of mixed detachments which veiled the advance of the Japanese columns.

The whole war is in favour of the strategic offensive, for the Japanese triumph was largely due to their initiative as well as to the hearty co-operation of fleet and army. So great is the

[1] Japanese had far more mountain guns.

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effect of initiative that even the defender should always aim at counter-strokes — a thing which Kuropatkin did not practise. The Japanese three armies on a wide arc of concentration, with all the dangers that menaced Moltke's wide arc of concentration in 1866, converged on Liao-yang and the Russian army, thus breaking Napoléon's rule, "Never concentrate under the beard of the enemy," and, worse still, they did this with inferior numbers.[1] The Russian Commander-in-Chief failed, indeed, to take advantage of his enemy's dangerous position, as Benedek failed in 1866—he was too anxious for his communications; he should have taken the offensive during the end of July, holding Kuroki, and massing against the other two armies, or *vice versâ*. He had plenty of time, for the Japanese were very slow, owing either to supply difficulties, or to a hope that the fall of Port Arthur would enable Nogi to arrive. The success of the Japanese was due not to strategic skill, but to "moral" and to the sluggishness of the Russian commander. Whether that general was, or was not, a free agent we do not know; but we do know that he committed errors in abandoning Zasulich on the Ya-lu, in sending Stakelberg southwards, in not taking advantage of Japanese dispersion when moving over the mountains into the Liao valley, and in permitting the defeat at Liao-yang. Immersed in detail, he was not a great leader.[2]

[1] See note, No. 6, p. 108. [2] See note, No. 7, p. 108.

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The soundest predictions with regard to this war appeared in British and United States publications, and the most unsound in German publications. The Germans, whose military predictions have not of late come up to their reputation, consistently backed Russia, possibly because her absorption in the Far East would relieve them of the nightmare of a war on a double front. The German Official Account pronounces against the wisdom of an early evacuation of Port Arthur and of a repetition of 1812, mainly because the population would not have acted as in that year and because of the political effect of a Russian retreat. The German Official Account also considers that Oyama should not have pushed so many troops through Korea, because they could, by landing in South Manchuria, have caused Zasulich to retire from the Ya-lu, and because they would, by landing earlier, have found Port Arthur weaker. They thus lost time through excess of caution and the political desire to occupy Korea. These German opinions are not necessarily sound, *e.g.* the South Manchurian coast is not free from ice till March 15, and French criticism is more favourable to Japan.

Excessive caution is constantly attributed to the Japanese, and was caused by financial considerations; Japan had to pay heavy rates for loans, and any reverse would have frightened the financiers.

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This war deserves consideration as being one between an island power and a great continental state, and as displaying the conditions of modern naval warfare; and its result may have far-reaching effects on the position of every European power governing Asiatic peoples. The causes leading to the victory of the Eastern power were "moral" and intelligence and an excellent medical service; whilst the causes leading to the defeat of the Western power were want of "moral" and intelligence and a bad medical service, to which the Russian author, Cheremisov, adds defective tactical training, constant interference with subordinates, absence of initiative, passive defence, and failure to surprise.

Russia was not prepared for this war, whereas Japan was thoroughly ready, though we cannot but blame her for not despatching her 7th and 8th Divisions to the seat of war, and for not landing troops at Ying-kou in July.

The Japanese system of disembarkation was sound, and Hamley's "Operations of War" has some pertinent remarks on the transport of troops by sea. It is there laid down that absolute supremacy of the sea is a necessary preliminary; that the rate of despatch depends on the number of vessels and of harbours; and that unless the landing be at a harbour it may be a difficult operation, and, if opposed, impossible, although it is not easy to defend a long coast-line. A great advantage it is that troops, moving by sea, can

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always keep secret their intended point of debarkation. Sea-transport is, however, not convenient for cavalry. Other cases of such movements are afforded by the Federals in 1862, by the English in 1854 and in 1899.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that the combatants fought out their quarrel in another country's territory, that both observed the honourable customs of war, that Press representatives were restricted by both sides, and that several international questions arose affecting maritime war, *e.g.* floating mines, neutrals supplying coal to a belligerent fleet, sojourn of a belligerent fleet in neutral waters, wounded sailors taking refuge on neutral warships, how far from the seat of war a neutral vessel can be searched for contraband, and numerous cases of contraband—Russia apparently declining to recognise any distinction between absolute and conditional contrabrand. Although, on these matters, the decisions of the Vladivostok Court were often indefensible, I believe that no objection can be taken to the decisions given on appeal by the High Court at St. Petersburg. Recently (1909), by the Declaration of London, Sir E. Grey has attempted to draw up a free list as well as a list of absolute and conditional contraband, but with what success remains to be seen.

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NOTES

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[1] Kobi brigade totalled 3,500 infantry. Mixed Kobi brigade, *e.g.* Guard mixed Kobi brigade, totalled 5,000 men and 18 guns. Four new Kobi brigades were raised, but as a rule the Japanese preferred to strengthen existing units. Kobi and dépôt troops held the communications.

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[2] Japanese cavalry was tied too much to the infantry, and therefore failed to complete their victories. The best cavalry was Akiyama's 1st Cavalry Brigade.

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[3] The Port Arthur fleet should have acted offensively, *e.g.* against landing of the 2nd Army and generally against Japanese communications.

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[4] The general acting on exterior lines has one problem before him, namely, how to converge his separated armies on the battlefield at the same time; the general acting on interior lines has two problems before him, namely, which separated hostile army to contain and which to strike, and when to do this. Kuropatkin chose the right time, but it is not agreed whether he chose the right army to strike. Note that Zarubaiev failed to contain Oku.

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[5] The Japanese used up their reserves early, which would have been dangerous if the Russians had employed strong counter-strokes, as they tried to do at Te-li-ssu.

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[6] Japanese strategic separation probably forced in them by the lie of the roads, but a safer plan would have been to move against Kuropatkin and then to retire and force him to accept battle in a place of their own choosing, *i.e.* strategic offensive and tactical defensive.

[7] Linevich's Army of the Ussuri—two Divisions and twenty squadrons—could have sent troops to Kuropatkin when, in the end of June, the Japanese plan became clear. They were fascinated by the fortress of Vladivostok.

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LIST OF QUESTIONS

1. Give a general description of the theatre of operations.
2. Discuss the general idea on both sides.
3. Write a note on the sea-transport of troops.
4. Estimate the tactical and strategic work of cavalry in this war.
5. Sketch the causes of the war.
6. Describe the military and naval resources of Japan in February, 1904.
7. Describe the military and naval forces of Russia in the Far East in February, 1904.
8. With rough plan describe the Battle of the Ya-lu.
9. Write some tactical comments on the Battle of the Ya-lu.
10. With rough plan describe the Battle of Nan Shan.
11. Write some tactical comments on the Battle of Te-li-ssu.
12. With rough plan describe the Battles of Yang-tzu-ling and Yu-shu-ling.
13. Discuss the Port Arthur question from the Japanese and the Russian standpoint.
14. Comment on the action of the infantry on both sides.
15. What appears to you to have been Kuropatkin's best plan against the Japanese?
16. End of April, 1904, Kuropatkin instructed Zasulich on the Ya-lu River. "Resist, but do not fight a decisive battle with superior forces." Discuss: How were these orders executed, and how should they have been executed?
17. Why is pursuit more difficult than, say, in 1806?
18. "If you stop in your entrenchments, you are beaten" (Napoléon). Discuss.

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